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This report describes the currenr. role of the Navy
Leadership and Management, Education and Training Program
(LMET) , and analyzes the benefits and limitations of Navy-
wide implementation. This methodology focused specifically
on the incentives and constraints on utilization of LMET
competencies. Interviews of a cross-section of 70 LMET
graduates were conducted in an effort to determine key
factors to promote competency use. Results indicate specific
recommendations regarding the use of the Navy's Human Re-
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Thucydides ' History of the Peloponnesian War in 415 B.C.
presented perhaps the first systematic document illustrating
the crucial role that individual leaders play in determining
the victory or defeat of their states. Through the presen-
tation of twelve vividly drawn characters, Thucydides im-
plicitly expressed some of the signal qualities of great
leaders and managers. He repeatedly noted the importance
of training leaders, and stated that "true safety was to be
found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhorta-
tions uttered when they were going into action." Yet he did
not attempt to explore how leaders can be developed. On the
contrary, his history, and specifically, the account of the
Sicilian Expedition, presented an unforgettable warning of
the consequences of the failure to replicate the previous
standards of Athenian leadership. Between Nicias, who was
an honorable man, and Alcibiades, who was not, the Athenians
engineered tneir cwn defeat. Indeed, Thucydides' history is
an early but not uncommon illustration of the thesis that
more wars are lost than they are won.
Despite their exhaustive knowledge of the dangers of poor
leadership, men during the 24 00 years since Thucydides have
continued to express their frustration with the difficulty
of defining what good leadership is, and how, [or if], it can
be taught. This exercise has been even more tantalizing
12

because most agree that leadership, if indefinable, is
certainly recognizable. Jus'tice White's comment on obscen-
ity applies equally as well to leadership: "I know it when
I see it."
Assuming, then, that effective leadership is a vital,
if elusive, key to military strength, the U.S. Navy has taken
the position that leaders can be "made," and leadership, like
the baton of command, can be handed down from generation to
generation of Naval officers. It is the goal of this study
to describe the Navy's latest attempt to effect this objec-
tive, to evaluate the current status of the Leadership and
Management, Education and Training (LMET) program, and to
recommend methods of reinforcing the existing efforts.
The experience of developing this particular study, and
the Navy's efforts in this area, have served to illustrate
the old Spanish proverb, "I'l is not the same thing to talk
of bulls as to be in the bull ring." The only meaningful
test of the Navy's LiyiET program will not be this work or
any other, but the demonstrated effectiveness of the U.S.
Navy a generation from now. It is important to remember that
superior leadership is ultimately measured, not by individual
careers, but by the ability of the Navy as an organization
to carry out national policy. Concentration on improving
leadership, carried to an article of faith in the last four
decades, has narrowed the focus of vision of those most com-
mitted to this goal. Good leadership and mission accomplish-
ment are neither mutually exclusive, conflicting, nor even
13

separate goals. The quality of leadership inevitably will,
and must, be measured by performance. No matter how honor-
able, intelligent, persuasive, or charismatic is a Nicias,
a Brutus, a Napoleon, or a Lee, they all still lost their
wars, the ultimate test of military effectiveness. Leader-
ship, then, and the Navy LMET program specifically, cannot
be implemented or evaluated in a meaningful way unless one
simultaneously considers organizational change in the Navy;
The salient difference between this study and previous
evaluations of the LMET program is that it will attempt to
incorporate the goal cf improved leadership with other
programs to effect organizational change in the Navy.
This view, however, insinuates a major methodological
problem: it is virtually impossible to measure with any
degree of scientific rigor the short-term effects of the
Navy-wide LMET program if one insists that organizational,
not individual, change must be the touchstone of success.
Yet, given the enormous resources invested in the LMET pro-
gram to date, the need to "test the waters," to obtain some
qualitative judgment of the program's effectiveness still
exists. This study will not attempt to procreate reams of
statistics only to conclude that they are not significant
at this time. The evaluations contained herein justifiably
can be criticized as impressionistic and subjective. This
paper reflects the judgment that there are other truths than
statistical truths. It is the choice between being roughly




Such a methodology carries a logic and value of its own;
what it lacks in rigor, it compensates by providing a deeper,
richer understanding. Moreover, this approach reflects a
certain artistic decorum: a congruence between the subject
and the style. For such subjective evaluation and strategic
decision-making are precisely what leaders are required to
do:
Life cannot wait until the sciences may have explained
the universe scientifically. We cannot put off
living until we are ready. The most salient charac-
teristic of life is its coerciveness : it is always
urgent, 'here and now, ' without any possible post-
ponement. Life is fired at us point blank.
(Jose Ortega y Gasset)
Finally, it is hoped that this study will contain material
of some practical benefit to the Navy. The outlined case
studies, workshops, and other methods of reinforcing LI4ET
competencies are considered to be the heart of this study.
15

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF NAVY LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
Comprehensive studies specifically addressing the develop-
ment of Navy leadership and management training programs
have been few, although the quantity of literature regarding
theories of motivation, learning, and organizational change
is mind boggling. Three previous works dealing with Navy
leadership training are particularly relevant. All are note-
worthy for their thoroughness and scholarship. Their find-
ings have contributed extensively to rhis study, particularly
in regard to the history of Navy leadership training programs
and the impetus for the development of LMET.
Auel's Leadership and Management Education and Training
Long Range Study Proposal is a Navy source document drafted
in 19 75 advocating the development of a leadership training
program based on rigorous empirical research which would seek
to develop specific leadership and management skills in a
systematic and comprehensive training program.. In short,
it advocated the development of LMET.
Parker's Leadership Trainina in the Navv, a master's /
thesis prepared for the University of Michigan in 19 80, pre-
sented the Navy's training efforts as a reflection of various
theories of motivation and organizational development. He
traced the development of Navy leadership training as both a
16

response to specific organizational problems and as a trend
toward defining, specifying, and transmitting specific skills,
culminating in an analysis of the Navy's LMET program.
Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET)
Effectiveness: A Pilot Study for Evaluation is a master's
thesis written by Lieutenant Commanders Vandover and Villarosa
for the Naval Postgraduate School in 19 81. This study advo-
cated the need to assess the effectiveness of the Navy's LMET
program in attaining its stated goals. It demonstrated the
advantages of the use of the pilot study as an evaluation
technique. It identified general issues of concern regarding
LMET. Finally, it recommended the implementation of a broader
pilot study to provide ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness
of the LMET program.
All three studies reviewed the history of Navy leadership
training efforts. All three studies demonstrated a primary
concern for efficiency and effectiveness of these training
efforts in changing individual behavior. The formal and
technical aspects of training are stressed. Finally, the
genesis and development of leadership and management training
as a form of technology transfer is a central theme in pre-
vious studies.
This work seeks to examine the role of organizational and
cultural interface with formal training in the Nav^', the
difference between what is taught and what is learned. It
is hoped that a slightly different angle of view will sharpen
17

and refine the chiaroscuro of the subject of study. For
this reason, this study will review the history of Navy
leadership training, admirably presented in previous works,
in order to highlight the role of the organization in rein-
forcing classroom training.
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NAVY LEADERSHIP
From its inception, the U.S. Navy has recognized that
"in no other profession are the penalties for employing
untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the
military" (MacArthur) . Furthermore, it has placed leader-
ship as the paramount goal of training.
Although the U.S. Navy adopted almost wholeheartedly
the practices, values, and traditions of the Royal Navy from
which it sprang, it differed from the beginning in one crucial
respect. It refuted, by the very act of revolution which
inspired its founding, the precept that a certain class of
m.en by birth are destined to be leaders. One of the tenets
of the Enlightenment was expressed by Voltaire: "the right
of command is no longer an advantage transmitted by nature,
like an inheritance; it is the fruit of labors, the price
of courage,
"
Nevertheless, it adopted the practices of developing
leaders than current in the Royal Navy. Young boys were
signed on as cabin boys at the age of seven under the care
and tutelage of commanding officers of specific ships . This
18

system was a legacy of the traditional apprentice system
dating back to the Renaissance.
The traditional training pattern of cabin boy to midship-
man to officer had many glaring weaknesses. Because young
men often received their entire training on one vessel with
one commanding officer, wardroom, and crew, the quality of
their training varied tremendously from ship to ship.
Training in the specific skills of seamanship and navigation
was haphazard and uncodified. Leadership was not explicitly
addressed. It was expected that midshipment would learn to
be naval officers and leaders by observing the example of
others, by listening to tales of' naval heroes and naval ex-
ploits, and by taking to heart traditional homilies of naval
wisdom.
«
The strengths of this traditional apprenticeship program
are perhaps lass obvious but no less effective. Graduates
of such training included John Paul Jones, Nathaniel Bowditch,
and David Farragut who assumed his first command at sea at
the age of thirteen. The long years of apprenticeship and
practice compensated for inadequate or inconsistent techni-
cal education. This system excelled in its formal and infor-
mal education. That is, it took children at an impressionable
age, enveloped them in the ''alien" Navy culture, and through
years of association transmitted the values and beliefs con-
sidered essential to a navy officer: Duty, Honor, Country.
Moreover, by testing the young midshipmen and by ensuring that
19

they would have years of experience divorced from diversions,
this system successfully embued them with a firm conception
of "the Navy way" or the way things are done, informal
learning.
While the methods of the apprentice midshipman system
were successful, the objectives of this training varied
greatly from ship to ship. Hence, the early U.S. Navy pro-
duced officers who had thoroughly assimilated a world view,
a sense of accepted practices and customs, and some practi-
cal technical skills. The difficulty lay in that nobody,
with any assurance, could say precisely what any individual
midshipman had learned.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING
1 . The Naval Academy
One of the earliest steps to rationalize, standardize,
and improve the quality of leadership training in the Navy
was the establishment of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis,
Maryland in 1845. From its establishment, the Naval Academy
sought -o teach both management and leadership skills: the
first and last years of the five year curriculum were spent
in academic study; the three intervening years were spent at
sea. Its stated purpose was, and remains, "to produce self-
confident leaders who accept and are fully ready to carry out
their responsibilities both to the nation they serve and tne
personnel they comm.and" (U.S. Naval Academy Catalogue, 76-77).
20

The superiority of the academic training, the techni-
cal and management skills required. of Naval officers, that
the Naval Academy provided is confirmed. The Academy also
has been largely successful at instilling common values and
a respect for Navy traditions by replicating an environment
similar to that experienced by midshipmen of an earlier era.
The Academy is an isolated environment in which midshipmen
are constantly tested and embued with the traditions and
values of the Navy:
Here, by precept and example, the application of sound
techniques of leadership, counsel, and guidance, and,
when required, corrective or disciplinary action,
midshipmen are measured, molded, and motivated for
the day when they will join the Navy or the Marine^ ,





^^^(U.S. Naval Academy Catalogue 1^-11)
The Naval Academy exhibits the trickle-down theory
of leadership training. A relatively small select body of
individuals are molded, at great cost in time and resources,
in the expectation that their example and influence through-
out their naval careers will improve the leadership and
readiness of the entire Navy. In MacArthur's phrase, they
are the drop of ink that "will color the water." This tra-
ditional approach to leadership training was satisfactory
until World War II, when all of the services required rapid
and drastic augmentation.
2 . World War II; Lessons Learned
Shortly thereafter appeared the phenomenon of the
"ninety day wonder, " officers who completed three months of
21

intense military training and then received reserve commis-
sions. This procedure was later institutionalized in 1951,
when the Officers' Candidate School was permanently estab-
lished in Newport, Rhode Island. It has continued to pro-
vide a training safety valve to produce large numbers of
reserve officers when rapid increases in officer manning were
required.
The experience of World War II changed the U.S. Navy
to a degree that no previous or subsequent war has. The Navy
carried the burden of the war in the Pacific; its role was
both more complex and more enduring than at any previous
time. It drafted huge numbers of civilians, many of whom
performed outstandingly, and most of whom performed in man-
ners at odds with, or. oblivious to, traditional Navy prac-
tices. This experience, coupled with the recognition that
the Navy of the future would be required to carry out the
responsibilities of the United States as the premier mari-
time nation of the world, created a need to augment tradi-
tional methods of Navy leadership training. With the advent
of nuclear warfare, the consequences of failure had become
awesome, while the requirement for responsiveness, flexi-
bility, and incisive judgment had become correspondingly
more pressing. One training manual summarized this plight:
The expansion of our Navy, the introduction of modern
sophisticated equipment and the requirement of heavy
operating schedules has forced junior officers into
the position of immediate responsibility with no
time for apprenticeship. This, coupled with the
attendant induction of many non-career men has
22

disturbed if not destroyed this traditional system
of the indoctrination of young officers.
(Division Officer's Guide, 1950)
The post-war Navy's initial response to this need
was to codify and clarify its standards in reams of dras-
tically revised and expanded directives. The revised Navy
Regulations was promulgated in 194 8, followed by a revised
Shipboard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) , The
Uniform Code of Military Justice , and the Code of Conduct.
The thrust of reasoning behind these new directives was
clear; their purpose was to reduce the realm of individual
decision-making by issuing explicit orders. Contemporary
with these new instructions were several manuals written and
issued to standardize and compress training. The Division
Officers' Guide , The Watch Officers' Guide , and The Armed
'
Forces Officer are examples of this effort. The Navy had
recognized that it could no longer afford the luxury of
years of cultural assimilation of its members. Thus, it
attempted to ensure the transmission of its norms and tradi-
tions primarily through technical rather than formal and
inform.al learning. The new guides were flogged as "the
distilled experience of thousands of junior officers who
have gone before you" (Division Officer's Guide, 1950).
3. Leadership By Fiat; The 1950 's and 1960
'
s
The Secretary of the Navy took a more active posture
toward improving the quality of leadership in the Navy in
1958 by issuing General Order 21. Again, this order reflected
23

the Navy's previous response to .the quandry of leadership
training; it sought to clarify, to make explicit, to leave
no room for doubt. It provided the official Navy definition
of leadership as
the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through
people. It is the sum of those qualities of intel-
lect, of human understanding and of moral character
that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group
of people successfully. Effective leadership,
therefore, is based on personal example, good
management practices, and moral responsibility.
(CNP, 1963)
It ordered all commanding officers to incorporate leadership
training into the technical training of their subordinates.
What the Navy could no longer accomplish through cultural
influence and tradition in a rapidly changing society, it
hoped to accomplish by ukase. The naivete of this order
was confirmed by its negligible and pro forma effect: "cut
and paste" directives were duly produced; leadership training ,
duties were delegated and re-delegated; and masses of junior
officers and young petty officers fidgeted through meetings
peppered with phrases such as "when I had command," or worse,
stonily listened to a peer stammer through any document that
conceivably could meet the requirement for leadership train-
ing. Increased gun-decking of this requirement was the
response to a largely ineffective program. The Navy's response
to declining em.phasis on leade. ship training was to re-issue
the General Order in 1963. Since the Navy did little to
assist commanding officers to implement this order, however,
the response was just as predictably ineffective.
24

The Navy exhibited another common tactic in its
quest for the chimera of good leadership in 1966: a change
in emphasis from the desirable to the doable. Leadership
training requirements were reduced to five single topics
and incorporated in the Navy's General Military Training
program (Auel, 1975). In effect, leadership was now placed
on an equal plane with such topics as the evils of venereal
disease and the moral imperative of blood donor ship. Standard
lesson plans and material were distributed to all Navy com-„
m.ands . Navy personnel were now bored by standardized and
authoritative material. Thus, the history of leadership /^
training could be seen as a pedestrian and bureaucratic
response to a bureaucratic directive. A previous study con-
cluded that "the leadership program fell victim to its own
frills and was downgraded by the Navy Institutionalists , be-
cause it was an intervention without sufficient input from
line managers" (Auel, 1975}
.
4 , Panic in the Pentagon: The Viet Nam Legacy
The Navy, during the end of the Viet Nam era, wit-
nessed an aging and deteriorating fleet of ships, increased
maintenance problems, and a host of personnel problam.s:
drug and alcohol abuse, NJP, unauthorized absence rates, and
racial tensions were increasing, while retention of petty
officers and junior officers continued to decline. Tv/o major
aircraft carrier fires and mounting racial tensions signalled
declining readiness and morale in the Navy, while technologi-




Some felt that these problems merely reflected the
violence of the United States during the late 1960 's, and
the disaffection and cynicism of the Watergate era, and
predicted that the Navy would return to an even keel as the
Viet Nam war wound down. However, other Navy manpower
specialists projected even worse seas ahead: they feared
that the Navy would be unable to recruit satisfactory per-
sonnel with the advent of the all volunteer force, and they
predicted that continued poor retention rates would create
a paucity of first-line supervisors to train the new per-
sonnel. They also felt that projected increases in minority
recruits would serve to aggravate the existing racial and
ethnic frictions.
During this tenuous transition period, ADM Zumwalt
was deep-selected as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . Un-
like his predecessors, Zumwalt felt that leadership training
alone was doomed to be ineffective unless it: was supported
by sweeping changes in the organizational norms of the Navy.
Therefore, he sought to effect a radical change in the
cultural fabric of the Navy itself. For this he incurred
the opprobriijm of those v/ho held these traditional Navy
values most dear: the senior officers and the chief petty
officers of the Navy, who felt that he was destroying their
authority and the efficacy of the chain of command.
Zumwalt, like those who went before him, established
his programs by fiat. However, his methods differed radically
26

from his predecessors; he made heavy use of the Navy media
to ensure direct contact with Navy personnel. Hi's use of
CNO SITREP films, highly publicized tours, and especially
his Z-grams promulgating new policy directly to all Navy
commands, were viewed by some as an insult to the Navy
hierarchy.
In retrospect, ADM Zumwalt's approach could be des-
cribed as a two-pronged attack, both a top-down and later
a bottom-up organizational intervention. But to do so makes
the Zumwalt efforts appear to be a closely detailed, coher-
ent straregy. In reality, the impetus for change seemed so
pressing, that decisions were often made very rapidly and
changes dictated before implementation plans were completed.
Z-gram.s were virtually a weekly occurrence, and the focus
remained on "the big picture." In summary, the Human Goals
program, the prototype of the Human Resources Management
Support System (HRMS), really accrued in piecem.eal fashion
from various Z-grams instituting programs to m.eet specific
needs. Nevertheless, the effect of Zumwalt's change efforts
were to force change from the top by establishing new defini-
tions, training requirements, practices, and standards of
morale. By establishing a series of new commands outside
the line chain of command, Zumwalt also hoped to achieve
change from the bottom up through H^-unan Goals Officers,
Racial Awareness Facilitators, and Drug and Alcohol Coun-
selors. These efforts were buttressed by new recruiting
27

policies actively seeking out qualified minority and female
volunteers.
In 19 70, Z-gram 55 established a task force to study
and make recommendations to improve personnel management and
the flow of communication up and down the chain of command.
The task force chose the Blake and Mouton managerial grid
model among those reviewed as the most useful for the Navy's
purpose. The Navy's N-man book was developed in 19 72, and
incorporated in leadership training. However, it was criti-
cized as being idealistic, simplis-cic, and rigid. Moreover,
although it encouraged Navy leaders to demonstrate high levels
of concern for both achievement and personnel, it did not
equip them with the means to do so. Self-awareness and
motivation to change v/ere supposed to be sufficient to im-
prove their leadership. These criticism, coupled with the
embarassment cf a pending lawsuit regarding the Navy's adop-
tion of Blake and Mouton 's model, prompted the Navy to drop
this approach.
It next developed a seven step model which reflected
more cf a contingency approach while retaining the task and
people concepts. This model was used in a Command Develop-
ment course in 19 72.
The Human Resources Management Support System (HFO^SS)
was established in 19 73, incorporating both leadership train-
ing and the various Human Goals programs in an effort to
provide greater quality control of the various entities. The
28

Human Resource Management Centers were placed under the con-
trol of Fleet Commanders and specified Type Commanders. The
Human Resource Management School was established in 19 74 in
order to upgrade and standardize the training and qualifica-
tions of HRM personnel.
During this period, the two week leadership training
program continued as perhaps the least offensive of the HRM
efforts. Its target population was the middle management of
the Navy, E-6 through 0-3 pay grades. Although some stan-
dardized material was provided for the use of HRM units, the
content of the courses varied widely. Each unit retained
wide autonomy in the content and presentation. For that
reason, it is difficult to characterize the training. At
its worst, it consisted of the grid model buttressed by tra-
ditional pearls of Navy wisdom and sea stories. Usually,
it presented several extant theories of managem.ent followed
by some case studies for discussion.
ADM Holloway's selection as Chief of Naval Operations
in' 1974 signalled a return to greater emphasis on operational
readiness, reliance on the chain of command, and stricrer
discipline. His stress on leadership training, coupled with
the desire of the HP>! community to strengthen this area, pro-
moted the development of Leadership Management Training (LiMET)
This training was based largely on Transactional Analysis
theory which had gained currency in civilian sectors. Fifteen
authorized training sites opened in 19 74, with specially
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trained LMT instructors. LMT followed the pattern of previous
courses, concentrating on E-6's, E-7's, and 0-1 's through
0-3 's. It was well-received, especially considering the
general resistance in the Navy at that time to any HRM
activity. Unfortunately, the quality of the LMT program
deteriorated by virtue of its own popularity and the hunger
of Navy personnel and commanding officers alike for an inter-
esting and useful leadership training course.
Frustrated by the difficulty of obtaining quotas at
the authorized training sites, commanding officers estab-
lished bootleg LMT courses within their own commands. This
allowed the commanding officers greater flexibility in schedul-
ing their personnel, and enabled them to attain almost 10
percent attendance. "By 19 76, there were 167 Leadership and
Management courses being taught, but only 15 were authorized"
(Mansfield, 1982). Students rarely knew whether they had
attended an authorized course or not, and much of their in-
creasing criticism of LMT can be ascribed to these bootleg
courses. Nevertheless, even the authorized version of LMT
tended to be more theoretical than practical in its emphasis.
D. INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LMET
1. Initial Goals of LMET
In 19 73, the Navy sought to review, rationalize, and
coordinate its various leadership training programs under
the umbrella of a single, integrated and cumulative training
strategy directly related to the actual leadership and
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management requirements of Navy leaders at crucial levels
in the chain of command. The resources the Navy expended on
leadership training at that time were significant, but the
resiiLts of these efforts were questionable. The Navy con-
ducted "58 formal training courses and 11 correspondence
courses costing 12.8 million dollars a year" in 19 75 (Auel,
1975 as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 19 81) . Several Navy
studies were initiated to propose the best method to accom-
plish this goal. Then the decision was made to utilize the
experience of civilian industry and academia to seek a fresh
approach to the improvement of the Navy's leadership training
program. The Navy contracted with McBer and Company to re-
search and develop a practicable and integrated leadership
training program. Its goals were stated as follows:
To provide a formal and systematic program for pro-
fessional development of Nav^' leaders at critical
points in their careers, based en research of effec-
tive Navy leadership.
To train officers and petty officers in the specific
leadership and management skills needed to perform
effectively at their level in the chain of command.
To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and
updating these programs.
To encourage Navy leaders to take personal
responsibility for implementing effective leader-
ship skills, by means of an educational approach
that emphasizes individual initiative and accounta-
bility for effective performance as a Navy leader.
(HPMC, N.D. p. 7)
2 . Theoretical Basis and Implicit Ideology of LMET
David McClelland, the co-founder of McBer and Com-
pany, has provided the m.cst consistent and pervasive influence
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on his corporation's basic tenets and methodology. Hence,
he may be viewed as the father of LMET. McClelland was a
clinical psychologist of the behavioral school who concen-
trated on motivation and_iliotive acquisition theory. In that
regard, McClelland reflected the primary interests of his
era in psychology. But, unlike Herzberg or Maslow, who con-
centrated on a needs-based motivation theory; and unlike
Lewin, Vroom and Yetton, Fiedler, Likert, McGregor, Blake
,
and Mouton, Bennis, and Rappaport who reflected interactional,
contingency-oriented approaches; McClelland pursued a per- 7
sonal traits focus on motivation. In The Achieving Society Y
and "Power Is the' Great Motivator, " McClelland elaborated
and refined his contention that the desires for power and
achievement are the strongest individual motivating forces.
McClelland specialized in constructing personnel
selection tests for specific job categories in civilian
industries. Later, he and McBer, Inc., concentrated their
effoms on designing and conducting customized training
programs to articulate and induce students to practice
specific operationalized characteristics deemed critical
for superior performance in specific jobs.
However, McClelland was distinguished less for his
theories than for his consistent emphasis on painstaking
empirical research and rigorous scientific approach. In
short, McClelland sought to apply technical, quantitative




of superior job performance. McClelland 's views and method-
ology were original and refreshing in his era. Moreover,
they satisfied the needs and appealed to corporate clients.
McClelland 's studies reflected the following
characteristics:
1. Emphasis on the individual worker.
2. Belief that the organization is the sum of the
individuals
.
3. Belief that personal motivation is the key to a
productive and effective organization.
4. Emphasis on the "first class man," the superior
performer.
5. Belief that superior performers exhibit specific
personal traits which make them successful.
6. Belief that skills are job specific.
7. Emphasis on extensive data gathering by observing
workers.
8. Belief that critical traits can be identified,
classified, and operationalized.
9. Distinction between critical and threshold skills.
10. Emphasis on quantifying data and deducing critical
skills through statistical analysis.
11. Belief that workers can improve their performance
through training, i.e., these skills can be
developed and replicated.
12. Overall objective of increased productivity and
organizational efficiency.
The appeal of McClelland 's theories and methodology
to top management of civilian or military organizations is
clearly civident. In the first place, his approach_j^S-__
geared to improving performance, a continuing goal of m.ost
organizations. Secondly, it is extremely pragmatic.
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McClelland' s statement that "If you want to test who will
be a good policeman,- go find what a policeman does. Follow
him around, make a list of his activities, and sample from
that list in screening applicants" (McClelland, 1973), is
virtually guaranteed to elicit agreement from the police
chief. McClelland' s principle of criterion sampling, then,
is not only pragmatic, but subtly flattering to top manage-
ment. McBer ' s approach defuses the threat of alien experts
intruding to tell top management how to run their organiza-
tion. On the contrary, it implies that the superior per-
formers (including top management) are the proper template
for others to copy.
McBer 's approach, then, stresses improvement^_through_-_
sicentific analysis. This, too, is appealing. It is analo-
gous to creating a technical library and "A" school for
leadership and management. This straightforward approach
appears to transform an extremely nebulous area into a clear,
systematic, quantifiable program. This, too, is appealing
to managers attuned to overseeing highly technical or finan-
cial arenas.
Finally, McBer 's approach is basically optimistic.
Implicit in its strategy is the belief that individuals can
be trained, and leaders can be made. Training can be an
extremely attractive alternative to an organization still
reeling with distress from the experience of radical organi-
zational change. Training becomes an even more seductive
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option when that training is designed and implemented by
the consulting firm. It is not difficult to understand why
the Navy in 19 75 readily accepted McBer ' s outlined research
and training development proposal. McBer ' s approach con-
tained similar characteristics and appeal that PERT did when
it was developed and used to successfully in building the
first Polaris submarine.
It can be contended that McClelland 's approach to
organizational effectiveness is remarkably similar to
Frederick Taylor's theories described in his seminal mono-
graph, "Principles of Scientific Management." A short com-
parison is instructive. Taylor specified four key principles
The first of the great principles of scientific
management ... is the deliverate gathering together
of the great mass of traditional knowledge which,
in the past, has been in the heads of the v;orkmen,
recording it, tabulating it, reducing it in most
:
cases to rules, laws, and in many cases to mathe-
matical formulae, which, with these new laws,
are applied to the work of the workmen.
The next of the four principles of scientific
management is the scientific selection of the work-
men, and then his progressive development. The
new way is to take a great deal of trouble in
selecting the workman.
The third principle is the bringing together of
this science .. .and the trained workman.... Offer
him a plan, something v/orthwhile. . , . If he will
not do it, let him get out.
The fourth principal. .. involves a complete redivi-
sion of the v/ork of the establishment.... It is
team work.
(Taylor, 1915)
McBer ' s LMET program and Taylor's Scientific Management hold
several concepts in common: the emphasis on precise data
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gathering, the importance of selecting and observing superior
performers, the reliance on quantifying and designing "the
best way/' and the faith in training. Similarly, both
exhibit a results-oriented approach. Taylor concluded his
essay with, "The very fair and proper question, the only
question to ask is 'Does it pay?' because if scientific
management does not pay, there is nothing in it" (Taylor,
1915) . It can be argued that McClelland has applied the
principles of Scientific Management to the tasks of leader-
ship and management.
3. LMET Research
McBer consultants commenced research to develop the
Navy LMET program in 19 76 utilizing the methodology which
McClelland had refined during previous studies in civilian
industry. They sought to gather data to answer the question,
"What makes a good Navy leader?" (Winter, 1979). Since the
Navy was by far the largest organization that McBer had
studied, they determined that a sampling technique was the
preferred method to obtain data and generate inferences about
the population. Extremely restrictive sampling was the only
way that the company could conduct the extensive interviews
they desired, given time and resource constraints. However,
the necessity for restrictive sampling caused something of a
methodological problem for McEer, since McClelland had main-
tained that research should be job specific, and the Navy
presented such a bewildering variety of leadership levels and
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situations. A very structured sampling technique was chosen
to satisfy these conflicting requirements. This technique
combined elements of both quota sampling and purposive sampling
(Stone, 1978) . That is, nominations of outstanding leaders
were solicited from commanding officers of each fleet. Thus,
the sample members were "hand picked" as superior leaders
to develop a sample that was satisfactory to the needs of
the study. Quota sampling was utilized within this selected
group to ensure that all eight leadership levels to be studied
and the v/arfare communities were proportionately represented.
The initial research was restricted to fleet units in Norfolk
and San Diego, possibly adding a tinge of convenience sampling
to skew the findings. A control group of "average" leaders
was also selected, again reflecting the various career ascen-
sion points and warfare comm.unities . Through this process,
"51 people (30 outstanding, 21 average) from the Pacific
Fleet, and 7 8 people (38 outstanding, 4 average) from the
Atlantic Fleet were identified to participate in the Be-
havioral Event Interview process" (Mansfield, 1982) .
The Pacific Fleet interviews were conducted first.
The Behavioral Event Interview was the central technique of
data gathering. The objectives of this technique were to
synthesize the advantages of the structured and unstructured
interviev; style.-. That is, it sought to give the subject
freedom of choice in the events he related to the interviewer
and preserve the richness, individuality, texture, and detail
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of the unstructured interview process. Yet, through exten-
sive training and practice, the interviewer "probed" to
elicit clarification of behaviors and other pertinent
information.
The Behavioral Event Interview focused on critical
incidents in the subject's career. Each subject was asked
to describe in great detail three unsuccessful and three
successful critical events. A useful incident would give
a clear and full account of the situation that led up to the
event, the participants, the subject's behavior and feelings
in responding to the situation, and its outcome (Winter, 19 79)
.
The purpose of such a detailed description was to elicit a
clear understanding of a superior leader's behaviors in
critical incidents.
From the 51 Pacific Fleet interciews, 36 were screened
as unbiased and useful for further study. A statistical
analysis identified_ 27 competency elements for study. Coding
and analysis of all 51 interviews indicated that the demon-
strated frequency of most of these competencies differentiated
the superior from average leaders.
The next step in the research was to validate this
initial list of competencies. The Atlantic Fleet interviews
were conducted and scored "blind; " the interviewers were not
told if their subjects were superior or average. Th ^ compe-
tencies v;hich were demonstrated as also statistically signi-
ficant in frequency among the Atlantic Fleet group were then
included in the list of Navy leadership competencies (Vvinter, 19 79'
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A second validation technique utilized written ques-
tionnaires to measure the use of the preliminary list of
competencies derived from the interviews. Nine different
tests were developed to m.easure specific competency elements.
1,000 Navy officers and enlisted personnel representing the
billet levels, warfare communities, and both fleets took the
tests under a controlled environment (Mansfield, 19 82) . The
purpose of this series of tests was to provide a larger N
against which to validate the interview findings. Addition-
ally, 61 of the interview subjects were tested to provide a
measure of correlation between the two research methods. Be-
havioral indicator variables were derived from the test re-
sults when a variable "was significantly correlated with
evidence of a competency elem.ent in an interview" (Mansfield,
1982) . A performance rating sheet completed by the test
takers' superiors provided a final means of cross-checking
and verifying differences in competency use between superior
and average performers. See Table 1 for a flowchart of
McBer ' s Job Competency Assessment Process.
The test results were then cross-tabbed with job
specific tasks and billets to provide further information
regarding situational differences in competency use (Winter,
19 79). Sixteen of the initial 2 7 competencies revealed
statistically significant__correlations and were_ labeled
com.petencies distinguishing superior leadership. These 16
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THE 16 FLEET COMPETENCIES
Following are the 16 fleet competencies and their
working definitions:
1. Sets Goals and Performance Standards . Outstanding
Navy leaders set goals to improve task performance and use
them to assess the ongoing performance of a task, as well
as the task's results.
2. Takes Initiative . When a problem is encountered,
outstanding Navy leaders take initiative in defining it,
accept the responsibility of acting on it, and move
immediately to solve it.
3. Plans and Organizes . Outstanding Navy leaders plan
and organize tasks, people, and resources in their order
of importance, and schedule the tasks for the achievement
of their goal
.
4. Optimizes Use of Resources . Outstanding Navy
leaders match individuals' capabilities with job require-
ments to maximize task accomplishment.
5. Delegates . Outstanding Navy leaders use the chain
of command to assign tasks by methods other than a direct
order, to get subordinates to accept task responsibility.
6. Monitors Results . Outstanding Navy leaders syste-
matically check progress on task accomplishment.
7. Rewards Outstanding Navy leaders recognize and
reward for effective perform^ance on a specific task.
8. Disciplines . In holding subordinates accountable
for work goals and Navy standards, outstanding Navy leaders
appropriately discipline subordinates, in order to increase
the likelihood of the subordinates' improved performance.
9. Self -conr.rol . Outstanding Navy leaders hold back
an impulse and instead weigh the facts, keep a balanced
perspective, and act appropriately.
10
.
Influences . Outstanding Navy leaders persuade
people ski].lfully--up, across, and down the chain of
command--to accomplish tasks and maintain the organization.
11. Team Builds . Outstanding Navy leaders promote team-




12. Develops Subordinates . Outstanding Navy leaders
spend time working with their subordinates, coaching them
toward improved performance and helping them to be skillful
and responsible in getting the job done at a high standard.
13. Positive Expectations . Outstanding Navy leaders
trust in people's basic worth and ability to perform.
They approach subordinates with a desire for the
subordinates' development.
14. Realistic Expectations . Although outstanding Navy
leaders believe that most subordinates want to and can do
a good job, they take care not to set a subordinate up for
failure by expecting too much. Concern about a subordinate's
shortcomings is expressed honestly.
15. Understands . Outstanding Navy leaders identify
subordinates' problems and help them to understand these
problems. Such leaders appropriately aid others in solving
their problems.
16. Conceptualizes . Outstanding Navy leaders dig out
the relevant facts in a complex situation and organize those
facts to gain a clear understanding of the situation before
actina.
Reference:




/ Table__3_indicates the correlation of specific competencies
with billet levels.
4 . LMET Instructional Design and Implementation
The key assumption of LMET is that the 16 identified
fleet competencies can be acquired through study and practice,
and that increased use of these competencies will result
in improved leadership and management in the Navy. Trans- ^^'y)J^
lating the competencies into a training program is a process
that has been given little attention in previous studies.
The LMET courses designed by McBer and Company are
based on a five step theoretical model of learning. This
learning process is illustrated in Table 9. McBer first
organized the 16 competencies into five clusters of similar
skills. See Table 4. Each cluster is addressed individually
throughout the course, and the students are guided through
the learning process for each cluster. This learning proc-
ess entails the following activities; recognition; under-
standing; self-assessment in relation to the competency;
skill acquisition and practice; and job application.
McBer' 3 description of each step in t:he learning
process is provided as follows:
1. Recognition . Participants form clear concepts
of the desired knowledge, skills, attitudes,
personal qualities, or values by recognizing
the competency in the specific, actual
thoughts and actions of superior Navy leaders.
Participants realize that troublesome problems
of the type they actually encounter call for
the competencies in question. Typically, the
recognition step uses material adapted from




IMPORTANCE OF' DIFFERENT FLEET COMPETENCIES
AT DIFFERENT LEVELS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
An "X" indicates that the competency is relevant to performance
in that billet. An "XX" indicates that the competency is
especially important to performance in the billet.-^
Competencies' CO/XO DH/DO MCPO/LCPO LPO/PO
CONCERN FOR EFFICIENCY
AND EFFECTIVENESS
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Among persons with largely leadership and management
responsibilities
.
2The indicator variables for these competencies did not
distinguish superior from average performers, so that their
relative importance among different billets cannot be
assessed with the data at hand.
Reference:




THE COMPETENCY MODEL FOR THE FLEET




















rather than reacting to
them
Takes new actions or
forms new plans without




a. Plans and Organizes Identifies action steps,
resources, and obstacles
involved in reaching an
objective






activities in new ways
to accomplish a task
Sets priorities by












• Matches people and jobs
to get the best perfor-
mance







• Clearly assigns authority
to others for task
accomplishment
• Uses the chain of comjnand
to get subordinates to
share in task management





• Keeps track of a work
process by seeking
information on its
progress or by direct
observation
• Checks on results of own
and others ' actions
• Evaluates the outcom.e
of a task against a
standard of performance
• Provides positive
feedback to people on















• Provides negative feed-







Holds back an impulse
to say or do something
inappropriate




weighing all the facts
Controls the urge to
"do it myself, " and
instead manages others
to take responsibility
for tasks assigned to
them
"Sells" ideas by putting









by appealing to a higher
purpose












• Explains why, shares
information, communi-
cates the purpose of
actions
• Communicates the need
for cooperation






• Acts to create symbols
of a group's identity,
pride, or team effort
• Transfers his/her exper-
tise to others through
example
• Provides the information
and encouragement neces-
sary to get the job done
• Coaches, by making train-
ing opportunities, expert
help, and other resources
available to subordinates





tion that people are capa-
ble of doing good work
















• Has a realistic concern
that people may not
follow or effectively
carry out instructions
• Acknowledges an individ-
ual's shortcomings as
well as strenths
• Is willing to express
displeasure, disappoint-
ment, and concern about
the shortcomings of an
individual's performance
• Accepts the feelings of
another person
• Figures out a person's
motivation, and has
evidence to back up
the diagnosis
• Responds to people appro-





a. Conceptualizes Rigorously searches for
and identifies the
available facts
Organizes facts and draws
realistic inferences
Analyzes information about
a situation by comparing what
exists now with what ideally
should exist, in order to
develop an overall plan of
action
Draws conclusions and makes




Excerpted from Mansfield, 19 82
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in the Behavioral Event Interviews used in the
earlier research phase of LMET design. Intro-
ducing the competencies in this direct, experi-
ential way creates maximum relevance and thus
a strong motivation for learning.
2. Understanding . Participants integrate the
knowledge that was learned in the previous
step into their own way of thinking, in order \ CL
to understand the competencies in their own
.}f^
personal "language," as connected to their
own experiences and concerns.
3. Self-assessment in relation to the competency .
Participants recognize the relevance of the
skills, attitudes, and personal qualities to
their own jobs, careers, and life goals.
They develop a sense of their own level in
each competency by a variety of assessment
and self-assessment techniques. As a result,
they can identify specific areas for change
and self-improvement.
4. Skill acquisition and practice . Participants
practice the skills and attitudes associated
with each competency, especially those that
have been identified for improvement in the
previous step. The atmosphere created in the
courses is supportive and free from distractions,
so as to allow practice of new skills and
refinemienu of existing skills.
5. Job application . Participants demonstrate and
receive feedback on the application of new
knowledge or improved skills and attitudes in
the classroom. They then go on to identify
situations in their Navy jobs where they will
use the competencies. Participants set goals,
anticipate obstacles, and.,.
(Winter, 19 79)
Thus, the instructional process is both discrete and
cumulative. The instructional techniques are extremely
varied and designed to appeal to a variety of learning styles,




McBer has attempted to include the following kinds
of activities within the segment on each of the five clusters:
1. Traditional educational techniques such as lectures,
readings, and written worksheets.
2. Discussions in both small and larger groups.
3. Group exercises.
4. Self-assessment through standardized tests and
procedures developed especially for LMET (about
which the participants learn)
.
5. Case studies.
6. Films (both explicitly instructional films and
general films that have a vivid didactic application)
.
7. Simulation exercises (including adaptations of
standard management simulation procedures, hypothe-
tical situations for which participants give an




However, the overriding objective of the LMET course
is not explicitly stated to the students and mentioned only
in passing in the design proposal. That is, "to enhance the v:
students sense of personal worth or self-image" (Winter, 1979)/.
Many of the instructional characteristics of the LMET courses
have been implemented with this basic objective in mind. A
great effort has been made to provide a safe, supportive,
and non-threatening environment to facilitate clearer self-
assessm.ent by the students, and to provide incentive to im-
prove. For this reason, the classes are comprised of peers
who are generally between tours of duty. The results of
the self-assessment exercises are not necessarily shared with
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Jthe class, nor are all activities, e.g., the ring toss game,
explicitly labeled as self-assessment exercises. The thrust
of the course is to provide guidance through the process of
individual self-discovery , desire to improve, and initial
attempts to acquire and master competencies. The emphasis
throughout the course is on each individual's unique talents
and potential to excel, and an open, non-judgmental atmos-
phere is fostered by the instructors.
In summary, McBer and Company did not presume to
be able to ensure that LMET graduates would master and apply
all of the 16 LMET competencies in their jobs after comple-
tion of a two week course. Instead, McBer sought to instill
in the students increased self-awareness, competency, recog-
m
nition, initial application of competencies in a safe and
supportive environment, and the motivation to improve their
skills in future assignments. "The ultimate goal is to .'
foster students ' continuing self-development in the leader-
ship competencies," one McBer report stated (Winter, 1979).
In essence, the LI-IET course is primarily a motivator
for individually monitored self-improvement.
The personal comprehensive plan is the final activity
in all LMET courses. It is a statement of personal
goals, shaped to the concepts and language of the
leadership competency model. Participants are encouraged
to formulate and describe realistic yet challenging
goals that are appropriate to their Navy leadership
situations, to become aware of difficulties and
obstacles to these goals, and to write out specific
action steps to overcome the obstacles and attain the
goals
.
A distinctive feature of LMET courses is the personal
student log, which the participant retains as a written
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record of the LMET experience. It contains his or her
self-assessment, life situation, and goals— all phrased
in terms of the now-familiar language of the competen-
cies as he or she understands them. It is a personal
written record of strengths and weaknesses", always
set against the standard of competencies that are
associated with excellence and superior Navy leadership
performance.
(Winter, 19 79)
Thus, the student log and the personal action plan
are the primary means of reinforcing the LMET competency
acquisition process. This technique is based on McClelland 's
earlier motive development program described in his mono-
graph, "Toward a Theory of Motive Acquis itiori^ McClelland
stated, "the participants were to regard themselves as 'in
training' for the next t^v'O years, in that 10-14 days is too
short a time to do more than conceive a new way of life"
(McClelland, 1965 as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 19 81)
.
According to McClelland 's own assessment, his course posi-
tively affected two out of three graduates (McClelland, 19 65
as cited in Vandover and Villarosa, 19 81)
.
McBer's efforts to date have concentrated on initial
implementation of LMET course for the Navy. Tables 5 and 6
specify the implementation of LMET course to date. Imple-
mentation of LMET for specific communities, such as the
Supply Corps and Recruit Training Command, has entailed modi-
fication of the basic courses to custom tailor them to the
needs of these communities.
The Fleet LMET courses, which were the first to be
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LMET COURSES IMPLEMENTED THROUGH 19 81
Location
a. TRITRAFAC Bangor, WA
b. NAVSUBTRACENPAC Pearl Harbor, HI
c. NAVTECHTRACEN Treasure Island, CA
d. NAVPHIBSCOL Coronado, CA
e. SWOS DET San Diego, CA
f. NAVSUBSCOL New London, CT
g. SWOSCOL Newport, RI
h. NAVPHIBSCOL Little Creek, VA
i. FLEMINEWARTRACEN Charleston, SC
j . FLETRACEN Mayport , FL








































1. HRMD Rota, Spain
m. SSC San Diego, CA
n. Great Lakes (BT 6 YO Program)









Excerpted from Mansfield, 19 82
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current fleet personnel to date. Chronic undermanning at
the E-6 level has tended to reduce the number of first class
petty officer graduates. Recent critical shortages of lieu-
tenant commanders and the consequent decision to reduce the
strength of officer training programs by one-third have
served to increase the pressure to shorten or waive the re-
quirement for all personnel who are ordered to fleet billets
to attend LMET. The severest blow to continued implementa-
tion of LMET to date was the decision to terminate the course
for Prospective Commanding Officers.
5 . Initial Evaluations
In 19 81, Captain William Jackson, the Navy's LMET
program manager, expressed his concerns regarding evaluation
of the effectiveness of the LMET program:
Some people may do very well in the training course,
but they may not be able to apply what they've learned
out on the job.... It's been very difficult to evaluate.
There's a certain am.ount of just feeling that it's the
right thing to do.. So far, v/e've relied mainly on
the favorable reports we hear informally from com-
manding officers whose men have been through the
training.
(Goleman, 1981)
Although a full-scale evaluation of the Navy LMET
program has yet to be conducted, there have been several
efforts to evaluate and improve certain aspects of the pro-
gram. First, and perhpas the most important among these
evaluations, are the reactions of the students themselves
expressed in critiques at the end of the courses. These





LMET COURSES BEING IMPLEMENTED IN 19 82
Location
a. USNA, Annapolis, MD
b. Navy Supply Corps School
Athens, GA
c. Officer Indoctrination
School (OIS) , Newport, RI
d. Officer Candidate School
(OCS) , Newport, RI
e. Naval Reserve Officer
Training Corps Instructor
Training, Annapolis, MD
f. Recruit Training Command/
"A" School (Memphis,
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THE COMPETENCY ACQUISITION PROCESS
RECOGNITION
Recognition of the competency when one sees it
UNDERSTANDING
Understanding how the competency relates to
managerial performance
ASSESSMENT





Using the competency on the job
APPLICATION
Consistent use of the competency on the job
appropriate to the context
Reference
:
Excerpted from Winter, 19 79
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very much enjoyed the course. This alone represents a vast
improvement over previous leadership training efforts
attempted by the Navy. Such reactions have been evident
even among those who were initially dubious of the value
of the course. Comments such as, "I thought it was going
to be just another bullshit course, but I really got a lot
out of it/' are representative of a common student reaction.
A second area of continuing scrutiny is instructional
technique. The LMET instructor course at Human Resource
Management School, Memphis, under aegis of CNET, has consis-
tently refined its screening, training, and evaluation of
prospective instructors. Similarly, LMET schools, especially
those at Coronado and Little Creek, have initiated and recom-
mended many improvements in instructional techniques based
on student reactions. Finally, the establishment of Quality
Assurance branches at some schools has provided a means of
independent evaluation of innovative techniques and a vehi-
cle for continuous assessment of the quality and content
of the actual instruction.
A third arena of evaluation was stipulated in the
contractual agreement between McBer and Company and the
Navy. It specified three areas of evaluation: continued -^
validation of the identified competencies; design and imple-
mentation of tests to measure individual performance levels;
and a study of the effect of LMET on indicators of Navy
organizational performance standards. McBer and Company has
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conducted studies to refine and cross-validate competencies
and their behavioral indicators. It has also recently de-
signed a new "Competency Development Guide" to replace the
current student log/action plan instrument. McBer is currently
testing and validating the "Navy Competency Assessment Pro-
file, " a test intended to measure effectiveness of LMET
training on individual performance. Both instruments are
available in the draft version only pending further testing,
revision, and approval for use in the LMET schools. The
third subject for evaluation, impact on Navy organizational
performance indicators, has not been measured to date. In-
deed, this objective would be virtually impossible to realize
when only a minority of Navy leaders have attended LMET.
An experiment utilizing a small sample would introduce ques-
tions of the ability to generalize to the population.
Finally, there is the difficulty of isolating LMET as a
causative factor, even if a high positive correlation between
LMET graduates and organizational performance could be demon-
strated.
All of these evaluations were confined to specific
areas of scrutiny. These initial efforts were also conducted
by those deeply involved in the Navy's LMET program who hold
a personal interest in its continued funding and expansion.
The first study of LMET by an independent observer was D.F. /
Parker's thesis, Leadership Training in the Navy . This re-
search, conducted in 1979 and 1980, is of limited value
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because the LMET program was too recently established to
allow a meaningful assessment of its effectiveness. Parker,
however, did question the rigor of the research methodology
employed by McBer and Company, specifically the coding proc-
ess and the small sam.ple size (Parker, 1980) .
The next evaluation effort was conducted and des-
cribed by Vandover and Villarosa in their 19 81 thesis, LMET
Effectiveness; A Pilot Study for Evaluation . The purpose
of this study was twofold: to assess the usefulness of the
pilot study method to measure LMET program effectiveness, and _.'
to identify issues of concern and formulate some initial
hypotheses to guide later research. The authors stressed that
their srudy was a "preliminary step to overall program evalu-
ation to determine relevant issues and investigate a method-
ology to confront them." (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981) . They
cited three prim.ary needs for a broader evaluation: to
ascertain if the Navy's investment in manpower and money is j—
warranted, to provide LMET program managers with feedback (
regarding specific strengths and weaknesses, and to encourage
a pro-active approach toward the managem.ent of the LMET pro-
grcim in the Navy. Although the authors agreed "there are
few clear cut effectiveness indicators, no impeccable stan-
dards, and no completely reliable method of measuring effec-
tiveness," they concluded that the pilot study was "an effective
means of gathering data concerning non-quantifiable, behavioral-




The Vandover and Villarosa study concluded with the
question with which this "study coinmenced. Specifically,
they stated.
The important issue that remains to be determined is:
does LMET school improve leadership/management
behaviors, hence increase managerial performance?...
There appears to be a definite [sic] need for further
evaluation on this subject, to determine if LMET
training alone can bring about managerial behavior
change or improvement resulting in increased per-
formance. If LMET School itself is not sufficient,
what if any additional support is needed?
(Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 129-130)
Their research indicated some initial findings of
particular relevance to this study. Among the 51 individuals
interviewed in the course of research, "there were no syste-
matic behavioral changes that ran across the sample. How-
ever, there were isolated behavioral changes v;hich were
clearly the result of LMET training" (Vandover and Villarosa,
1981, p. 88) . The authors also noted a dichotomy between the
individual's ovin perception of behavioral change as a result
of LMET and change validated by the individual's superior
and subordinates. "About one-fourth of all graduates be-
lieve they have changed yet this change is not validated....
Behavioral change as a specific result of LMET School is not
at all assured" (Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, pp. 103-104)
.
Other findings pertinent to the present study regard-
^
ing means of effecting and reinforcing behavioral change
were also cited. The Vandover and Villarosa study indicated
that the student journal was not an effective means of rein-
forcement; "only 27% of the sample actually used the journal
69

as a reference or guide to a problem they were encountering"
(Vandover and Villarosa, 1981, p. 113) . Other issues of
concern indicated by the findings were listed:
Communication Aspects of Rewarding and Disciplining
The Setting of Goals and Performance Standards
Feedback Concerning Performance
Finally, the study touched upon the effect of the general
command climate on the LMET graduates' performance. No
clear response pattern emerged from the sample surveyed, but
the organization's effectiveness, especially in the realm of
communication, appeared to be an influential factor on the
behavior of the LMET graduates. The authors were reluctant
to draw any conclusion from the data available. However, they
#
stated that "it may ... indicate a strong need for external
support mechanisms in order for LMET to succeed" (Vandover
and Villarosa, 1981, p. 114) .
E. OTHER THEORETICAL MODELS: THE JANUS APPROACH
Alice laughed, "One can '
t
believe impossible things."
I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the
Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it for half
an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many
as six impossible things before breakfast."
(Carroll, 1862)
1 . The Dialecric of Ontology
The thesis of this work to this point has been that
McClelland 's theories, as reflected in LMET, embody in a
very attractive form certain values in our society, specifi-
cally belief in the efficacy of individual initiative.
70

rational analysis, and the efficacy of technology. Perhaps,
it would be enlightening at this point to review a diverse
body of literature representing the "humanist" theme in
organizational theory and focusing on the processes of
acquiring and modifying perceptions of reality.
Martin Heidegger's essay "Being and Time" is con-
sidered to be a seminal work which has influenced both the
existentialist movement and systems theory of organization.
In an extremely abstract, densely textured essay, Heidegger
investigated the provenance and purpose of human existence
and human knowledge. In a sense, his essay was the philosophi-
cal equivalent of a theory of motivation and learning. In
addressing the role of science, he stressed the importance
of the process:
The importance of the research always lies in the
establishment of concepts, its true progress comes
about not so much in collecting results and storing
them in "handbooks" as in being forced to ask ques-
tions about the basic constitution of each area,
these questions being chiefly a reaction to increasing
knowledge in each area.
The real "movement" of the sciences takes place in
the revision of these basic concepts, a revision which
is more or less radical and lucid with regard to
itself. A science's level of development is deter-
mined by the extent to which it is capable of a
crisis in its basic concepts. In these immanent
crises of the sciences the relation of positive
questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable.
Today tendencies to place research on new foundations
have cropped up on all sides in the various disciplines.
(Heidegger, 1927)
In his essay "What Calls for Thinking?", Heidegger
elaborated his contention that in the quest for knowledge.
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the individual tests the upper and lower limits of his own
unique equation in relation to his environment:
This is why we are here attempting to learn thinking.
We are all on the way together, and are not re-
proving each other. To learn means to make every-
thing we do answer to whatever addresses us as
essential. Depending on the kind of essentials,
depending on the realm from which they address
us, the answer and with it the kind of learning
differs.
A cabinetmaker's apprentice, someone who is learning
to build cabinets and the like, will serve as an
example. His learning is not mere practice, to
gain facility in the use of tools. Nor does he
merely gather knowledge about the customary forms
of the things he is to build. If he is to become
a true cabinetmaker, he makes himself answer and
respond above all to the different kinds of wood
and to the shapes slumbering within wood--to
wood as it enters into man's dwelling with all
the hidden riches of its nature. In fact, this
relatedness to wood is what maintains the whole
craft. Without that relatedness, the craft
will never be anything but empty busywork, any
occupation with it will be determined exclusively
by business concerns. Every handicraft, all
human dealings, are constantly in that danger.
(Heidegger, 1954)
Emile Durkheim addressed the problem adjusting
to the imperatives of large organizations in a fragmented,
industrialized society in The Division of Labor in Society ,
He first coined the term ancmie as a symptom of the stress
reduced by the loss of a sense of community. He concluded
that:
the remedy for the evil is not to seek to resuscitate
traditions and practices which, no longer responding
to present conditions of society, can only live an
artificial, false existence. What we m.ust do to
relieve this anomie is to discover the means for taking
the organs which are still wasting themselves in
discordant movements harmoniously concur by introducing
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into their relations more justice by more and more
extenuating he external inequalities which are the
source of the evil
.
Because certain of our duties are no longer founded
in the reality of things, a breakdown has resulted
which will be repaired only in so far as a new
discipline is established and consolidated. In short,
our first duty is to make a moral code for ourselves.
Such a work cannot be improvised in the silence of
the study; it can arise only through itself, little
by little, under the pressure of internal causes
which make it necessary.
(Durkheim, 189 3)
Weber, in his controversial study. The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalization , also noted this
multiplicity of perspectives and the limitations of rationalism
in his investigation of the need for achievement:
This sample proposition, which is often forgotten,
should be placed at the beginning of every study
which essays to deal with rationalism [one may]
rationalize life from fundamentally different basic
points of view and in very different directions.
Rationalism is an historical concept which covers
a whole world of different things.... We are here
particularly interested in the origin of precisely
the irrational element which lies in this ... concep-
tion of a calling.
(Weber, 19 21)
Ferdinand Tonnies addressed this contrast in his
study "Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft" to differentiate
between the group that is held together by common ties of
feeling and the organization that integrates roles around
instrumental objectives" (March and Simon, ?)
.
In another early work, T.N. Whitehead addressed the
relationship of the information organization within the
formal organization. Leadership in a free society noted the
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pervasive influence of informal groups and their demonstrated
flexibility and efficiency in response to change v/hen unim-
peded by the formal organization. Whitehead concluded:
No society or organization is adverse to change,
provided the initiative for that change takes
place at the relevant level--at that level where
the daily activities have shown the need. Under
those conditions, change will present itself not
as an interruption, but as the natural flow of
social living.
(Whitehead, 1936)
Berger and Luckmann, in their well-known book. The
Social Construction of Reality , examined the sociology of
knowledge. Expanding on Heidegger's thesis that the indi-
vidual defines himself and his universe through an ontologi-
cal quest, the authors conducted a sociological analysis of
"the knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life" (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966) . Their study is divided into objective
and subjective reality. They formulated a central paradox
common to the studies cited herein:
The institutional world is objectivated human activity,
and so is every single institution. In other words,
despite the objectivity that marks the social world
in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an
ontological status apart from the human activity that
produced it. The paradox [is] that man is capable
of producing a world that he then experiences as some-
thing other than a human product ... .The relationship
...remains a dialectical one . . .externalization and
objectification. . .then internalization.
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966)
In discussing society as subjective reality, the
authors address the barriers to secondary socialization, a
subject central to an evaluation of the effectiveness of
current LMET courses. They conclude:
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The fact that the processes of secondary socializa-
tion do not presuppose a high degree of identifica-
tion and its contents do not possess the quality
of inevitability can be pragmatically useful because
they permit learning sequences that are rational
and emotionally controlled. But because the con-
tents of this type of internalization have a brittle
and unreliable subjective reality compared to the
internalizations of primary socialization, in some
cases special techniques must be developed to pro-
duce whatever identification and inevitability are
deemed necessary ... .A professional revolutionary...
needs an immeasurably higher degree of identification
and inevitability than an engineer ... .Secondary
socialization becomes affectively changed to the
degree to which immersion in and commitment to the
new reality are institutionally defined as neces-
sary. . . .An important circumstance that may posit
the need for such intensification is competition
between the reality defining personnel of various
institutions
.
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 132-133)
A consequence of "a society in which discrepant
worlds are available," they note, is "that one's own
institutionalized conduct m.ay be apprehended as 'a role'
from which one may detach oneself .... Individuals .. .play
at what they are supposed to be" (Berger and Luckm.ann, 15 66,
p. 158) .
In Beyond Culture , Edward T. Hall scrutix^ized simi-
lar issues of the process of learning and Weltanschauung
from an anthropological perspective:
In his strivings for order. Western man has created
chaos by denying that part of his self that inte-
grates while enshrining the parts that fragment
experiencs-.. . .The natural act of thinking is greatly
modified by culture; Western man uses only a small
fraction of his mental capabilities; there are many
different and legitimate v;ays of thinking; we in the
West value one of these ways above all others--the
one we call "logic, " a linear system that has been
with us since Socrates. Western man sees his system
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of logic as synonymous with truth. For him it is
the only road to reality.
(Hall, 1976, p. 1)
Hall sets forth six principles to advance his
thesis:
1. An individual cannot through introspection and
self-examination understand himself or the forces
that mold his life, without understanding his
culture.
2. Cultures won't change unless everyone changes.
3. Cultures is dictatorial unless understood and
examined.
4. It is not that Man must be in sync with, or
adapt to his culture, but that cultures grow
out of sync with Man. When this happens,
people go crazy and they don't know it.
5. In order to avoid mass insanity people must
learn to transcend and adapt their culture to
the times and to tJieir biological organisms.
•
6. To accomplish this task, since introspection
tells you nothing, man needs the experience of
other cultures, i.e., to survive, all cultures
need each other.
(Hall, 1976, pp. 282-283)
Failure to examine one's own perceptions of reality,
Hall contends, results in the continuation of several kinds
of irrationality: situational, contextual, neurotic, insti-
tutional, and cultural (Hall, 1976, pp. 282-283)
.
Garrett Hardin explored the social consequences of
the failure to question basic assumptions of Western indus-
trial societies in his famous essay, "The Tragedy of the
Commons." Again, this work carries im.plications regarding
the effectiveness of LMET. Hardin defined a technical
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solution as "one that requires a change only in the techni-
ques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing
in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality"
(Hardin, 1968)
.
Hardin averred that many human problems do not admit
a technical solution. Instead, they require a re-examination
of the concept of individual freedom, "a fundamental exten-
sion in morality" (Hardin, 1968) . Failure to question basic
assumptions will result in the tragedy of the commons, a
remorseless and inevitable decline from which escape is futile
Hardin believed -that an appeal to conscience was use-
less if unrewarded. He cited Gregory Batescn's concept of
the double-bind dilemma:
Sooner or later [the individual] , consciously or
subconsciously, senses that he has received two
communications, and that they are contradictory:
(1) [intended communication] "If you don't do as we
as}^, we will openly condemn you for not: acting like
a responsible citizen;" (2) [the unintended comn'.uni-
cation] "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly
condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into
standing aside while the rest of us exploit the
commons.
(Hardin, 1968)
Hardin concluded that the only solution to these
problems was in "mutual coercion." He did not pretend that
this was desirable, only necessary to continued existence.
2. Systems Theory Models
Several notable figures in the field of cybernetics
have drawn heavily on theoretical works discussing the
dialectic of ontology. Borrowing by analogy the open systems
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framework from the natural sciences, they have constructed
a systems theory of organizations. Central to this theory
is the focus on organizational change and its relationship
with individuals and the environment. Etzioni advocated a
systems model rather than a goal model for organizations
because it encouraged more realistic expectations for in-
ducing change (Etzioni, 1960)
.
Katz and Kahn described several characteristics of
organizations based on their systems model . They stressed
that the interrelationships, the action at the boundaries,
served to define the organization and effect change. Per-
haps their most interesting contribution was the concept of
equifinality : there does not have to be a single method for
achieving an objective. James Thompson, in "Organizations
in Action," drew on Heidegger's ontological model in stating
"the organization must develop processes for searching and
learning as well as deciding. ... It must set lim.its to its
definition of situations; it must make decisions in bounded
rationality.
"
Burns and Stalker, in "Mechanistic and Organic Sys-
tems" concluded that organic systems operating in a rapidly
changing environment, placed much heavier demands on the
individuals in the organization to perform.
The only wa^ "his" job can be done is by his partici-
pating continually with others in the solution of
problems which are real to the form, and put in a
language of requirements and activities meaningful
CO them all.
(Burns and Stalker, 1966)
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I3. Training Managers for Organizational Change
Alternative proposals for training leaders to cope
with a rapidly changing technology and environment have
been set forth. William B. Eddy in "From Training to
Organization Change," contended that training and change
efforts must go hand in hand with an emphasis on process
rather than goals. He believed that neither effort could
be successful implemented alone.
Fiedler specifically addressed the quotation of
leadership training in the military in "How Do You Make
Leaders More Effective?" He called for an analysis of
"situational favorableness, " and maintained that changing
the job is more efficient than attempts to change the
individual (Fiedler, 1972)
.
French and Bell contended that leaders could be
improved through use of organizational development tech-
niques to enhance "problem-solving and renewal processes"
(French and Bell, 19 72)
.
F, STATUS OF THE NAVY HRM PROGRAM: 19 75-19 82
The history of LMET and the rest of the Navy's Human
Resources Management activities has been one of separate
development. Little interaction, cooperation, or even
exchange of ideas has been evident since the LMET schools
were established as independent commands. One explanation
preferred is that those involved in the LMET program desired
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to avoid at the outset the negative attitudes often directed
at the Human Resources Management System in general
.
The HRM program was still suffering from antagonism to
its efforts generated by the sweeping organizational changes
directed during the Zumwalt era. The history of the HRM
program after 19 74 could be viewed as an illustration of
Machiavelli ' s famous warning to those who would be agents
of change:
It must be considered that there is nothing more diffi-
cult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order
of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those
who profit by the old order, this luke warmness arising
partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the
laws in their favor; and partly from the incredulity
of m.ankind, who do not truly believe in anything new
until they have had actual experience of it. Thus it
arises that on every opportunity for attacking the
reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal of parti-
sans, the others only defend him half-heartedly, so
that between them he runs great danger.
(Machiavelli, 1513)
Since 19 75, the HRM community has continued to stress
professionalism and dedication of its activities to the
improved readiness of operational units. Simultaneously,
it has suffered periodic cuts in funding and manpower.
The imperative to eradicate a generally negative (and un-
fair) image, coupled with chronic resource constraints,
have served to hinder the Human Resources Management Sys-
tem's effectiveness as agent? of organizational change.
One encouraging trend, however, has been the increased
practice of organizational development techniques and a
corresponding de-emphasis on the lock-step pattern of the
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Human Resources Availability (HRA.V) cycle. Despite these
efforts, only in isolated commands has the HRM community





The methodology for this study entailed the author's
participation in two discrete research projects investigating
actual use of LMET competencies in Navy commands . Both pro-
jects included a large number of researchers and were led by
senior individuals. For these responses / the author was not
in a position to make final decisions regarding research
design. This lack of autonomy was far outweighed by the ad-
vantages of participation in these research projects: availa-
bility of funding and administrative support; logistic support;
training by McBer personnel in interview techniques; and the
capacity to interview and analyze a significantly larger
sample than the alathor could have dene individually. Finally,
the opportunity to work with individuals of the highest aca-
demic and professional calibre in both research pro jeers was
the overriding consideration in choosing to participate in a
group project.
A. NAVY POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL RESEARCH PROJECT
1 . Background and Design Considerations
NMD-6 had expressed an interest in studying what compe-
tencies are demonstrated by superior leaders of heterogeneous
work groups. Do they employ heretofore unidentified competen-
cies? Does the frequency of their use of the 16 fleet compe-
tencies differ from that exhibited by leaders of homogeneous
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work groups? These issues had been discussed with McBer per-
sonnel as areas warranting further research. In the interest
of cost-effectiveness, the decision was made to conduct this
research utilizing Navy personnel at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) Monterey. The advantages to the Navy of this
avenue of research were clear: the research costs were pro-
jected to be less than ten percent of line costs of con-
tracting the research with McBer. Moreover, NPS personnel
had expressed an interest in such a project. The assets
were available; the school's Organizational Development
curriculum was among the most highly regarded in the nation.
Moreover, they were knowledgeable about the Navy.
The contract was approved in late 1981, and the re-
search group was formed in January, 1982. The research pro-
ject manager was an NPS professor. A full-time researcher
and a research/administrative assistant were hired to direct
the daily research progress. Seven NPS students in the Organi-
zational Development curriculum volunteered to participate
in the six month research project.
At the outset, all seven graduate students intended
to utilize the data gathered through the research project
in the preparation of their respective theses. The students
submitted their proposed topics to the researchers who incor-
porated questions in the demographic survey to enable the
students to utilize the basic data for their particular purposes
later on. For example, for the purposes of this particular
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study, all interview subjects indicated whether or not they
were LMET graduates and the billet level and completion date
of their courses.
Since this research project was specifically studying
LMET competencies and designed as a follow-on project to the
original McBer and Company research, it utilized the same
methodology that the original LMET study employed.
2. The Sample
Research sites included San Diego, the San Francisco
Bay area, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. These locations were
selected primarily because time and funding constraints did
not allow a broader study. However, since all three areas
were fleet concentration points, many commands remained avail-
able for study. Local Human Resources Management specialists
were contacted in each geographic area to suggest commands
containing heterogeneous work groups. HRM specialists also
provided information regarding the general command climate for
each unit. These individuals were utilized for this infor-
mation because they were knowledgeable about the various
commands, yet they retained a certain measure of independent
judgment.
Following the example of the McBer methodology, a
combination of quota and purposive sampling was utilized.
That is, approximately equal numbers of superior and average
performer's were selected by r.heir commanding officers to be
the interview subjects. Quota sampling was maintained by
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choosing approximately equal nuirbers of commands in the
surface fleet, aviation, and shore establishments. Quota
sampling was also used to select approximately equal numbers
of LMET and non-LMET graduates. Quota sampling again was
employed to obtain approximately equal numbers of interview
subjects representing four different billet ascension levels:
Leading Petty Officer, Leading Chief Petty Officer, Division
Officer, and Department Heads. The researchers also specific-
ally requested the commanding officers to include some minority
and female personnel among those selected as interview sub-
jects. Again, this request introduced an element of purposive
sampling. However, the majority of the interview subjects,
both superior and average, were white males. During the
progress of the research, the group was requested to interview
members of the "Women at Sea" program. For this reason, an
unusually large number of rhe female subjects were assigned to
fleet units, possibly showing this element of the sample. A
total of 134 subjects were interviewed, and 93 were later used
in the statistical analysis.
The sample differences between the McBer research
project and this one are as follows:
1. All NPS interviews were conducted within the
Pacific Fleet.
2. NPS interviews included members of the shore
establishment. McBer interviews were restricted
to personnel from fleet units.
3. McBer interviews proportionately represented
members of the submarine, aviation, and surface
warfare communities; the NPS project did not
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interview any individuals currently assigned to
submarines due to the relatively heterogeneous
nature of their crews.
4. NPS interviews included a significantly higher
percentage of female and minority members.
5. All NPS interviews were conducted in the blind;
only the Atlantic Fleet interviews were blind
in the McBer project.
6. No individual was interviewed by both research
groups
.
7. In the NPS project, the size of the work groups
and the number of interview subjects varied at
each site due to the schedules of the partici-
pants and the work requirements of the commands.
8. During the NPS research, the designation of
superior and average performers occasionally was
made by the executive officer or immediate
superior rather than by the commanding officer.
9. Some commanding officers provided unequal numbers
of interview subjects designated superior and
average.
10. One command designated the interview subjects
selected as "good" and "bad" performers.
3 . Behavioral Event Interviews
a. Training
Prior to the commencement of the data gathering
phase, the NPS research group received training in how to
conduct the behavioral event interviews. The training was
conducted by an individual from McBer and Company during an
intensive two day seminar titled "The Interviewing for Compe-
tence Workshop." The NPS group members then completed addi-
tional practice interviews which were sent to McBer and




The behavioral event interview, following McBer '
s
methodology, was to be the primary information source from
which the competencies would be identified. The focus of
the behavioral event interview is "on what it takes to do
a given job well" (McClelland, 1978) . Meanwhile, behavioral
indicators are stressed in order to provide the empirical
data from which the initial hypotheses can be generalized.
c. Technique
Each behavioral event interview normally lasts
one and one-half to two hours. All interviews were tape re-
corded, with the subject's permission, and conducted in
private. At the outset of the interview, all subjects were
assured that absolute confidentiality would be preserved and
that remarks could be erased if the subject so desired. The
purpose of the research project was briefly explained. The
subjects were informed that they were selected because they
were members of a heterogeneous or "mixed" work group. The
interviewers carefully provided any implication regarding the
quality of the subject's performance in order to avoid biasing
the interview.
The interviews commenced with some general questions
regarding the nature of the subject's work groups, the group's
tasks, and the subject 3 individual duties and responsibili-
ties. The ulterior purpose of these questions was to relax
the subject, establish some degree of rapport, and to make
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the subject forget about the tape recorder. The interviewer
probed the subject and asked him to clarify anything that
the interviewer did not understand. The purpose of the initial
probes was to lead the subject naturally into a description
of his first behavioral event, or critical incident. The
subject was asked to describe the event in great detail.
McBer ' s methodology stipulated the following guidelines:
You should have in mind the following questions as the
interviewee begins to tell the story:
1. What led up to the event?
2. What was the person thinking? (of the individual
he or she was interacting with, of the situation.)
3. What did the person do, and why?
4. What was the person feeling, wishing?
5. How did it all turn out?
You are interested in the interviewee's:




5. Conclusions for future reference.
(McClelland, 1978)
After the first behavioral event, the subject
was requested to describe additional events in the same man-
ner. The interviewers aimed to collect a total of six com-
plete incidents from each subject, preferably three descriptions
of successful events and three narratives of events in which
the subject felt unsuccessful. At this point in the interview,
the research should have collected several detailed "vignettes






At the end of the interview, the siibject was
asked to describe the characteristics of a superior performer
in his or her particular job. This exercise provided further
insight into what the subject considers to be important. It
also provides a means to compare and contrast the subject's
conceptualization of the desired traits with the subject's
own behaviors as illustrated in the behavioral events.
Table 10, excerpted from McBer ' s "Interviewing for Competency
Workshop" provides a quick summary of the behavioral event
interview objectives and process as designed by McClelland.
Table 11, immediately following, is excerpted from the same
workshop. It specifies problems that commonly occur during
the interview process and suggests methods for the interviewer
to overcome them.
d. Advantages of the Behavioral Event
Interview Methodology
The behavioral event interview aims to avoid the
danger of research bias posed by a structured question for-
mat. By utilizing a structured probe strategy, the interview
elicits the most significant job experiences as seen by the
interview subject, rather than those imposed by the inter-
viewer. The interview technique is designed to be investiga-
tive rather than reflective, that is, it's consistent focus
is on determining what the narrator actually did. It deter-
minedly avoids analytical, reflective, hypothetical, and
leading questions. For this reason, the interviewer is








To establish an informal,
friendly tone
Process
Begin with small talk (about
the weather, office, etc.)
.
To establish the interviewee's
trust in the interviewer and
in the confidentiality of
the interview
Tell how the information
will be used.
Request permission to use a





To establish understanding in
the interviewee of the inter-
view in the context of the
study or need
Say: "I need to talk to
the real expert about the
job and the kinds of situa-
tions you run into,
because ..."
To create understanding in
the interviewee of the format
of the interview and your
role in the process
Establish the interview
time frame.
Outline the components of
the interview.
l.a Optional Com.ponent: Career Path
Objectives
To form a picture of the
interviewee's career path
and goals, and the critical
steps in the path
Process
Ask the interviewee for:
-- educational background,
— major jobs held, and
their responsibilities,
-- major transitions in the
career, and






To focus the interviewee on
talking about himself or
herself
Search for a moderate degree
of detail, concentrating on
concrete descriptions.
To make a transition from
interviewee's past into the
present (or future) job
Say: "May we talk now about
some specific situation from
your past that you believe
has been helpful to you in
your present (future) job?"
2. Description of Duties and Responsibilities
Objectives
To get an overview of the
interviewee's job, with the
interviewee giving specific
information (listen for men-
tion of or allusion to criti-
cal incidents to which you
can return later)
Process
Keep it brief (15-20 minutes)
Ask for present job title.
Ask: "Who reports to you,
and to whom do you report?"
Ask for major responsibili-
ties: "V7hat do you do in
a particular day or week?"
To be clear about how the
person spends' tim.e: on what
specific activities
Search for a moderate amount
of detail.
To train the interviewee to
focus on specifics
Say: "Could you give me an
example?
"






To provide a clear transition
from this job overview to the
first critical incident, or
"behavioral event"
Say: "May we talk now about
some specific situation





3. First Behavioral Event
Objectives
To provide guidelines for the
kind of information sought
(it can be technical or non-
technical)
Process
Say: "Can you think of a
time or a situation on this
job. .
.
— when things were particu-
larly effective?"
— that you felt was a high
point?"
-- when you were satisfied?"
To get as clear and detailed
an account as possible
Get the total situation. Ask:
— "Who was involved?"
-- "What did you think, feel,
want to do?"
— "What did you do or say?"
— "What was the outcome?"
— "How did you feel about
the outcome?"
To get a time sequence, and
to train the interviewee to
tell the story in the
greatest possible detail
Say:
— "Could you walk me through
this situation from the
beginning?"
— "What happened first?"
To encourage the interviewee
to volunteer another behav-
ioral event: a critical
incident or situation
Say:
— "That's exactly what I'm
looking for."
— "Can you think of another




4. Additional Behavioral Events
Objectives
To get two to three descrip-
tions of effective and two
to three descriptions of
ineffective behavior
Process
To obtain descriptions of less
effective behavior, say, "Can
you think of a time when...
— you weren't satisfied?"
-- you wished things had turned
out differently?"
— things didn't go so well?"
-- you had some problems?"
— you were really frustrated?"
Again, to get as clear and
detailed an account of the
events as possible




To form a transition from
this component to the final
questions of the interview
Say: "May we wrap up now
with a few final questions?"..
5. Performer Characteristics
Objectives
To obtain a list of abili-
ties, traits, and kinds of
knowledge that the inter-
viewee feels are important
to perform his or her job
Process
Say:
-- "If you were hiring some-
one to do your job, what
do you think he or she
would have to be able to
do?"
— "What abilities, knowledge,
or other characteristics
would you look for?"
To use this process to gener-
ate additional specific exam-
ples of events in areas that
you may have overlooked
Say: "Can you give me an







6. Summary and Interpretation
Objectives Process
To make a complete record of As soon as possible after the
the interview, including the interview, use the Interview




INTERVIEW PROBLEMS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM
1. Introduction
Problem
Interviewee acts nervous or
uncertain about why he or
she is being interviewed.
Interviewee seems uncomfor-
table with the use of a
tape recorder.
Possible wavs to handle
Say: "VJe ' re trying to under-
stand what it takes to
do jobs like yours. We'll
be talking to a number of
people, because we want
to represent as many
different experiences
as we can . "
or: "Only you are the expert
at what it takes to do
your job .
"
Say: "I just need it to help
me with my notes."
or: "If there is anything you
want off the record, I'll
turn it off. It's really
up to you. But remember
that everything you say
will be kept in confi-
dence . "





Possible ways to handle
Ask the interviewee to choose
one of the most important
responsibilities or tasks and
give a recent example of when




3. First Behavioral Event
Problem
INTERVIEWER asks questions
that are too complicated, or
has trouble thinking of
appropriate questions.
INTERVIEWER probes for de-
tail too soon, or cannot
seem to find a thread for
a behavioral event.
Possible ways to handle





"What did you do?"
First let the interviewee give
you a broad picture of the
story. Then probe for details
about the key part of the
event.
Interviewee is giving too
much information, too fast,
or is scattered in giving
you information.
Interviewee says he or she
can't remember the actual
words in a conversation.
Say: "I'd like you to slow
down a bit. Could you
go back to. . . ?"
or: "I'm not sure I under-
stand that sequence.
Could vou walk m.e through
it?"
Say: "Just give me the flavor '
of it. What sort of
thing did you say?"
"Try to reconstruct the
dialogue right now to
describe your memory of
what happened. Make
believe I'm the person
you were talking to."









"Is there anything else
you do on your job?"
"Was there anything else
you did during that time?"









talks of the philosophy of




is evasive or refuses to
answer questions because he
or she is concerned about
revealing confidential mate-
rial about himself, herself,
or others.
Tell about an experience of
your own in behavioral-event
story form, to illustrate the
kind of material you want.
Reward the interviewee when-
ever he or she provides a good
behavioral event: say, "That's
exactly the kind of information
I'm looking for."
Ask for specific examples:
— "What did you actually say
to him or her?"
— "How did he or she respond
to that?"
-- "What did you say then?"
Say: "I don't need any names.
Just tell me what happened."
or: "It's O.K. to disguise
the organization and
people's names. I'm.
only interested in what
happened and your part
in it."
THINGS TO REMELMBER WHILE




reward the interviewee for
providing information you
need.
stay with one situation.
get a complete picture of
the job as performed by
the interviewee.
accept generalizations.
let too much tim.e pass when
you are not getting specific
information
.
allow the interviewee to change
the topic until you have a
complete behavioral event.
test out your ideas about





Try to Try not to
elicit very detailed behavi-
oral descriptions of how the
person does the job.
let the interview flow as
long as the interviewee is
"on track."




fill all the gaps in the
narrative by eliciting the
needed data from the
interviewee.
take complete notes, so
that you could, if neces-
sary, reconstruct the inter-
view from notes alone.
assume you know what is
happening, or who is involved,
unless this has been specifi-
cally stated by the interviewee






thoughts, conversations, and actions. The behavioral event
interview .aims to remove the subject's own perceptual filter,
his thoughts and values, to determine the actual motives,
abilities, and knowledge demonstrated in the course of their
work. Additionally, the behavioral event interview seeks to
concentrate on the most critical skills for job success. In
McClelland 's estimate, this methodology pinpoints "the ten
percent of the behaviors that make ninety percent of the
difference" (McBer, 19 81)
.
One of the significant features of this technique
is its inclusiveness; it seeks to specify both social and
technical knowledge and skills deemed critical to superior
performance. The technique claims to avoid a prior: limits
on job competencies. In short, the behavioral event inter-
view provides a vehicle to remove the biases of both the
interviewer and the interviewee to promote untainted empiri-
cal research. For this reason, an inclusive working defini-
tion of a job competency is viewed by McClelland as a key
feature of the behavioral event interview technique . Some
of the characteristics of a competency are described as
follows:
It can be an individual piece of knowledge, an
ability, a trait, a self-image, or a motive.
It is generic: it underlies and defines patterns
in an individual's observable behavior on the job.




It enables the individual to perform the required
job functions better than an individual who does
not possess the competency.
(McBer, 1981)
For these reasons, McClelland claims that the behavioral
event interview produces significantly more accurate data
in this particular field of inquiry.
4 . The Interview Experience
After the members of the NPS research group had parti-
cipated in McBer's interview training and completed their
certification tapes, they began the data collection phase.
After consultation with local Human Resources Management per-
sonnel, either the research program manager or one of the paid
researchers contacted likely commands by telephone. Every
effort was made to speak directly to the respective command-
ing officers to explain the nature of the project and to
solicit his personal assistance and support. If the command-
ing officer agreed to host the research group, then the re-
searchers conducted further business with the executive
officers and cognizant department heads. Verbal communications
regarding the proposed interviews were followed up by form
letters delineating the purpose of the research project, the
nature of the research group, the importance of the venture
to future LMET course design, good specific requirements
for the interviews. These letters were designed for ready
incorporation as enclosures to a command notice informing
command members of the researcher's visit. The time, date.
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space, and duration requirements, and criteria and confiden-
tiality in selection of interview subjects were specified in
a separate enclosure for the use of the commanding officers.
a. General Procedures
The researchers received in advance of most
visits an interview schedule listing date, time, interviewer,
assigned interviewee, the designated interview code number
for the tape, and the office number of the private interview
space. The vast majority of interviews were conducted weekly
on Thursdays or Fridays from January through May 19 81. This
schedule was designed for the mutual convenience of the Navy
commands and the research group.
Researchers generally travelled as a group and
always convened prior to entering the environs of any command
studied. Researchers wore civilian clothes since the research
group itself was extremely heterogeneous, being comprised of
Army and Navy graduate students of different ranks, a pro-
fessor who was also a retired officer, and two civilians
completely unfamiliar with the military. It was agreed, how-
ever, to be forthright with the interview subjects regarding
the identity and status of the interviewers.
The research group met briefly with the command-
ing officer and executive officer of each unit prior to com-
m.encement of the interviews. Interest in the findings of the
research project and a generally favorable reaction to the
Navy's LMET program were commonly expressed during these
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meetings » At this time, the commanding officer's designation
of the selected interview subjects as "superior" or "average"
'was handed to one of the researchers in a sealed envelope to
prevent biasing the interviewers. The interviewers were then
introduced to their subjects and escorted to the respective
private interview spaces.
The research group provided all required equip-
ment and forms. Table 12 represents a form used by the
interviewer to facilitate notetaking. Table 13 was completed
by each interviewee to provide demographic data for later
statistical analysis. Table 14 was also completed by the
interviewee to provide a concise summary of the mission, size,
and heterogeneity of the interviewee's work group. Ail inter-
views v/ere tape recorded by the interviewer for later trans-
cription. The tapes were augmented by the interviewer's
notes regarding the behavior of each subject. At the conclu-
sion of each interview, the research group reconvened at a
previously specified location for a short de-brief with the
.commanding officer. The content of the interviews was never
discussed; instead, the purpose was a matter of courtesy and
to gain further insight into aspects of the command climate
which might affect the employment of job competencies,
b. Difficulties Encountered
Although the general description of the information
collection experience to this point has implied that it was
a smooth, well-ordered process, there were many exceptions to






1. Purpose ; Interview to be used in a study to develop a
competency model for managers of diverse
(heterogeneous) work groups .
2. Use of Model ; training
3. Length of Interview ; 1 1/2— 2 hours
4. Why you ; You are (or have been) a manager of a hetero-
geneous work group ; you're an expert in what
it takes to do the job.
5. Outline Interview Process ; a) Describe general information
concerning job and major
responsibilities, b) Then
you'll be asked to describe key
situations (critical incidents)
in which you felt effective or
not so effective as manager of
heterogeneous work group ,
c) You'll be asked to given an
overview of the situation—then
I will probe for specifics.
6. Confidentiality ; Data are confidential and only used for
research purposes. Individual remains
anonymous.
7. vVhy tape recorder; to assist in note taking (get permission)
INTERVIEW PROCESS




2. Job Title :
3. Division ;
4. How long in job ; Quick summary of career to date




6. Who reports to you ;
a) Break out of diverse work group (# Minorities, Women,
civilian/military, etc.)
b) Any other factors leading to group's diversity?
7. Major duties and responsibilities
Behavioral Events: Describe events where you felt effective
or not so effective in managing a
heterogeneous work group .
For each you'll be asked to:
- Give a brief general overview of
situation
- What led up to the situation?
- Who was involved?
- What were you thinking and feeling?
- What did you do?
- What did others think/feel/do?
- What was the outcome?
- How did you feel about the outcome?
* (Be especially alert to probe for behaviors, attitudes,
thoughts and feelings of subject as well as people in
work group to discover cross-cultural dynamics)
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
- What would you look fcr if you were going to hire
someone to be a manager of a heterogeneous work
group? (Or what would you train someone to do?)
Reference:





This information will provide demographic data for use
in a study to develop a competency model for m-anagers of
heterogeneous work groups. All information is for research
purposes only and is confidential. Please complete this form


















Are you an LMET ^'raduate? Yes
What year?














BEI INTERVIEW FORM FOR iVIANAGERS








How long in job: years
Reports to:
______^__
People reporting to interviewee:
Breakout of heterogeneous work group, numbers of:
Women: Filipinos:
Civilians: Asians:
Civilians with prior military experience:
Blacks: Others:
Hispanics:
Other factors contributing to group's heterogeneity;




Titles of Behavioral Events
1.













Excerpted from research interview of NPS study
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by the research group are summarized below. The researchers
quickly discovered that their technical competence in operating
and performing minor repairs on their government- is sue tape
records was weak indeed. The author's tape recorder failed
to operate at all at the commencement of her first interview.
Her interviewee turned out to be an ideal subject in this
instance, however. The individual was an Electronics Techni-
cian, and repaired the tape recorder on the spot. A seemingly
minor, mechanical aspect of the information collection process
proved to be fraught with hazards for researchers: tapes
broke, adapters failed to adapt, batteries died at inauspicious
moments, and different microphones demonstrated their individual
eccentricities. Many difficulties with the quality of the
tape recordings lay in the environment where the interviews
were conducted. Operational Navy activities tend to be noisy
places; tapes were punctuated by sounds of engine and fan
vibrations, aircraft landings and take offs, jet engine tests,
1-MC announcements, ringing telephones, and clicking type-
writers. Clearly, there was a discrepancy between interview
training in the calm of academia and the interview experience
in the real Navy. Private interview spaces were limited and
haphazard, and no amount of cushions could deaden the extrane-
ous sounds, much to the dismay of the transcriber. A certain
number of otherwise valuable interviews were deleted for these
reasons. Another tape recorder associated difficulty was
discovered later; the transcriber's machine was not synchronized
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with the interviewer's counters, making it extremely diffi-
cult for the transcriber to start at a specified point.
Although the tape recorder problem presented the
largest class of difficulties during the interview experience,
the researchers encountered other unanticipated obstacles.
Occasionally, the host command failed to provide an interview
assignment schedule, causing temporary coding difficulties.
In several instances, last minute substitutions of interview
subjects required the researchers to obtain additional data
at a later point. The subjects frequently had difficulty
completing the form illustrated in Table 14, especially re-
garding the definition of "the work group" and in describing
the characteristics of its personnel. As found in previous
studies, the interviewees frequently cnofused LMT courses
•with LMET courses. These minor hindrances were quickly over-
come as the researchers began to anticipate them.
Space, privacy and confidentiality proved to be
chronic problems, however, especially given the space limi-
tations of Navy ships. Interviews at times necessarily were
interrupted to respond to urgent operational needs or to
allow others to enter their work and berthing spaces. One
young officer returned from taking a shower after a mid-watch,
only to find his stateroom occupied by the author and her
interviewee. Other interviews literally were conducted in
supply and janitorial closets, behind torpedo racks, and on
avionics' work benches. The researchers themselves were at
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times a hazard; those unfamiliar with Navy ship frame and
compartment designation systems were known to become lost
returning from the head.
Other minor difficulties centered around the
selection of the interview subjects. It was not uncommon
for the researchers to discover that the interviewees had
been notified only shortly before the interview. Their lack
of knowledge regarding the nature of the research or the dura-
tion of the interview, and the necessity for them to make
last minute arrangements in their schedules, understandably
hindered their enthusiasm for the project. Some subjects,
even some superior performers, made poor interview subjects
because they lacked facility with the language. The strong
accents of others caused transcription difficulties. The
interviewers' jargon-spiced vocabulary also caused problems.
For example, one young petty officer confused the terms
"heterogeneous" and "heterosexual." The researchers quickly
learned to employ a less rarified vocabulary.
5 . Post- Interview Work
Shortly after the conclusion of each interview, the
interviewer again reviewed the quality of the tape recording.
The interviewer then completed the second half of the form
exhibited in Table 14, expanding on the subject's duties and
responsibilities in terms of job competencies. The Behavioral
Events described by the subject were titled and listed, indi-
cating whether each represented a high or low point. The
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"Interviewer's Summary" provided a written narrative of the
salient features of each incident in order to preserve the
date if the tape should become lost or damaged. The inter-
viewer employed the subject's own vocabulary as much as
possible.
After completing the description of the behavioral
events, the researcher would list the competencies evident
in the interview and refer to specific examples.
The interviewer's summary and interpretative when
done in a conscientious manner, provided additional data for
later analysis. This portion provided the researcher the
opportunity to record unobtrusive performance measures and
qualitative observation. Significant or recurring themes
were also noted for future reference. Some of the observation
suggested by McBer for the researcher's attention included:
(1) physical appearance of interviewee and his or
her office (e.g., neat/messy)
(2) conversational style of interviewee
(3) words and phrases that interviewee used
repeatedly
(4) how interviewee made you feel (e.g., uncom.forta-
ble, relaxed) , and what he or she was doing to
have this effect
(5) difficulty you had getting interviewee relaxes
or able to talk about high and low points
(6) way in which interviewee handled subordinates
in your presence
(7) kinds of materials interviewee pulled out
for you to look at




(9) how interviewee seems to handle different
situations in similar ways
(10) things that seem to be missing our out of place
in interviewee, in comparison with other people
in same job whom you have interviewed.
(McBer and Com.pany, 19 81)
The researcher's next step in the post- interview
work procedure was to listen to the entire tape and indicate
on the Transcription information form., the beginning of each
behavioral event. The post-interview work was an extremely
time-consuming process.
6. The Interview Coding Process
The interview transcripts were proofread by the
interviewer for accuracy. Many Navy terms and acronyms
were defined at this time for greater clarity. The inter-
viewer then indicated whether he considered the subject a
superior or average performer. Interview transcripts were
then exchanged among the researchers. A second reader then
indicated his impression of the interviewee's performance.
The second reader also identified tentative themes that dis-
tinguished between the performance levels. Recurring subjects
of behavioral events were also classified and filed at this
time for the later use of the graduate students in their
specific areas of inquiry. Particularly good examples of
either themes or subjects were highlighted for future refer-
ence. The initial review provided a re ugh organization of the
now extensive data and served to provide a verification cf the
commanding officers' judgment of the interviewees' performance
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The research group then participated in a two day
competency identification conference. This process will not
be described since its purpose lies outside the purview of
this study. However, the specific code book and behavioral
indicators that were used for the coding process were finalized
during this conference. They represented a modification of
the McBer LMET competencies. The primary difference between
the two lists was that the NPS list contained some additional
competencies.
During the coding process, the research group was
divided into teams of two members each. Each team was respon-
sible for coding twenty interview transcripts. Each member
performed the primary coding for ten interviews and secondary
coding for his partner's assigned interviews. The coding
process entailed an initial reading ofthe entire interview,
followed by detailed textual scrutiny. The primary coder
then identified and labelled the code for each competency
and behavioral indicator in the margin of the interview
transcript. Upon completion of the primary coding, the
partners exchanged transcripts. The secondary coding was
performed in the blind. That is, the codes assigned by the
primary coder on the left margin were covered to avoid biasing
the secondary coder. Upon completion of the secondary coding
process, x.he codes were compared. Although all coders had
been drilled, the definitions of the various competencies and
their behavioral indicators had received the same guidelines
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regarding desired frequency of coding, they demonstrated
widely discrepant results during the initial coding attempts.
As coding partners reviewed the texts simultaneously and
discussed their different judgments item by item in excru-
ciating detail, they reached a consensus and attained a
fair degree of reliability in their subsequent coding deci-
sions. However, each two member team continued to exhibit
radically different coding judgments, both in frequency and
in labelling, throughout this phase. Independent personnel
at a later date were assigned the task of providing inter-
rater reliability among the coding teams. In the opinion of
one individual responsible for inter-rater reliability, the
process was "extremely dubious."
Other factors which bring into question both the
validity and the reliability of the codes include time con-
straints, interest of the coders, attention span of the coders,
influence of one strong personality on his partner, and
willingness to engage in debate regarding coding anomalies.
It could be contended that the codes of the more influential
or more interested partner tended to prevail, regardless of
their validity. Similarly, the inter-rater reliability
personnel could be viewed as exercising a disproportionate
influence regarding the raw data used in statistical analysis.
After the coding process was completed, a total of
93 interviews, representing 4C6 behavioral events, were
^LT L.J. Fraser, oral comment to author, October, 19 82
114

determined to be sufficiently useful for statistical analysis.
The competency codesheet data was then transferred onto a
master frequency of competency sheet. These tables served
as the basis for the raw data entered into the Naval Post-
graduate School computer.
7. The Competency Analysis Process
Two of the researchers, supported by individuals in
the computer systems curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, conducted the statistical analysis of the coded data
gleaned from the behavioral event interviews. Each incident,
or behavioral event, was defined as a case. These cases
aere then subgroupsed under the categories of "interview" and
"interviews of superior (or average) performers." The com-
petencies were listed as variables. Various demographic fea-
tures comprised the remaining variables. The Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was employed for statisti-
cal analysis. Frequencies of competency use were the primary
measures of distinguishing superior from average performers.
Then cross-tabs were performed to determine if the data demon-
strated a statistically significant: correlation between the
various demographic variables and frequency of competency use.
Various standard parametric and non-parametric statistical
tests were performed on the data. Differences between LMET
and non-LMET graduates, both among the class of superior
performers and the aggregate of average performers, were tested,
Tests regarding any correlation between command characteristics
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and frequency of competency use were restricted to the three
broad categories: surface, aviation, and shore establishments
The author undertook a qualitative vs. quantitative
assessment of the interview transcripts using the case study
method to determine some effects of LMET training on indi-
viduals and command factors which affect the employment of
LMET competencies. Although this case study approach utilized
the same body of data that the statistical analysis employed,
its methods were necessarily qualitative and subjective.
However, the author viewed this methodology for analysis to
be complementary to the statistical analysis performed by
other members of the Naval Postgraduate School research group.
8. Assessment of Methodology
In the judgment of the author, some review and assess-
ment of the methodological approach as a whole is in order.
Passing comments regarding possible strengths and weaknesses
of specific activities have been offered when considered
appropriate. The methodology, following the McBer model, was
empirical in approach. Buckley and Chiang, in Research
Methodology and Business Decisions , have presented a useful
summary of these aspects of empirical research:
Strengths
:
1. It is best suited to analyzing actual behavior.
2. It is best suited to fact-finding, to seeking
reality
.
3. With respect to case and field studies, it
provides the richest context in which research
can take place.
4. With respect to laboratory studies, it provides





5. Through observation, the researcher is required
to enter the arena of research, to get involved.
6. Very advanced monitoring equipment can be used,
as can sophisticated techniques such as gaming
and simulation.
Deficiencies:
1. It is deficient with respect to analysis of the
past or the future— it is limited to the present.
2. It requires the most time.
3. Only a relatively few situations can be studied
(sample size) , they must be proximate to the
researcher, and the ability to generalize is greatly
restricted.
4. With respect to observation:
(a) There are inherent deficiencies in the observer.
(b) Systematic biases attend the observational
modes of participant or non-participant and
obtrusive or unobtrusive.
(c) It is difficult to develop the skills of
observation and to train others to do so.
(d) Observation itself can become an agent of
change.
5. With respect to case and field studies, it is
difficult to draw the parameters around the
problem.
6. With respect to laboratory studies:
(a) Crucial variables may be excluded in the
attempt to achieve clean experiments.
(b) There is bias inherent in the design and
conduct of experiments. The researcher
decides which questions of issues to
explore and the context under which the
responses are given.
(c) Subjects tend to role-play.
(d) Subjects are often imperfect surrogates
for the principals they represent.
(e) Subjects' responses may be influenced
by overt or covert hostility toward the
researcher and/or the experiment.
(Buckley and Chiang, 1976, p. 45)
a. Issues Regarding the Small Sample Case Study
Methodology
Because the dominant trend in behavioral science
research has been toward more quantitative, scientifically
rigorous work, perhaps special attention should be devoted
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to justifying the author's approach. This study is viewed
as being complementary to, -not contrary to, statistical
analysis methods. It is an attempt to illuminate other factors
not captured in statistics. It is an attempt to see the story
behind the statistics.
Textual analysis can also prevent the drawing
of hasty conclusions concerning the direction of cause and
'
effect in statistical correlations. For example, a high '
correlation could be demonstrated between females assigned
to sea duty and those who are superior performers. A super-
ficial review might conclude that assignment to sea duty
imprves the quality of performance of women in the Navy.
However, the cause-effect direction might be the reverse:
that superior female performers are more attracted to the
challenges of a sea duty assignment and are thus more likely
to be found in such billets. It is this type of information,
the story behind the numerical correlations, which can be
explored through case study analysis.
More persuasive arguments can be found in the
literature which can- be used xio support this approach. In
"Alternative Approaches to the Study of Complex Situations,"
Weiss suggested that analysis of complex situations may use
either an analytic or a holistic approach. He contrasted
these methods as follows:
What goes on in the mind of an investigator who, when-
ever he is asked to study a complex situation, thinks
of survey research? He probably assumes that the task
of research is to discover consistent relationships
118

between elements, that consistency can be demonstrated
only within a large sample, that relationships can be
established and evaluated only with reliable measures.
The result is a survey. A holistic assumption, on
the other hand, that the aim of research is to dis-
cover the organization of elements, would lead to
different emphases and consequently to different
research designs.
(Weiss, 1966, p. 201)
Since holistic research aims to preserve the nuances of many
factors on the subject of inquiry, it demands data which re-
flects the complexity of the subject matter. "Only in this
way can the investigator be assured that the data have within
them a report on the functioning of each of the system's
elements. This demand for density leads to the case study
or small sample study as preferred research designs" (Weiss,
1968, p. 345)
.
Evered and Louis address similar methodological
considerations, and the characteristics of each approach,
labelling the paradigms "inquiry from the outside" and "inquiry
from the inside." They maintained that "the quality of a
piece of research is more critically indicated by the appro-
priateness of the paradigm selected than by the mere technical
correctness of the methods used" (Evered and Louis, 19 81,
p. 386). They concluded that scientific analysis, inquiry
from the outside, exhibits serious limitations.
Research from the outside systematically overlooks
critical features ... [which] include the definition of
human action in specific settings, the actor's particu-
lar definition of his situation [world, field] , the
human interest [motives, purposes] of the organizational
actor, and the historical context of the situation.
Such shortcomings can be overcome by inquiry from the
inside.
(Weiss, 1966, p. 392)
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In utilizing such a methodology, the aim is not
to test a set of hypotheses; rather the aim is to discover,
organization, pattern, or system in the subject of inquiry.
This research is exploratory and hypothesis-generating.
Much of the present study focuses on the experiences of
individual interview subjects with no claim to hypothesis-
testing or generalizability.
b. Methodological Difficulties in Textual Analysis
Textual analysis of interview transcripts in a
case study approach presents some methodological pitfalls
analogous to those experienced by those engaged in statistical
analysis. In textual analysis, these pitfalls pertain to
misinterpretation or misuse of the verbal data. These
methodological sample measurements and use of parametric
tests on ordinal data in statistical analysis. However,
semantic analysis offers perhaps greater scope for misinter-
pretation by the researcher. Some of these semantic obstacles
to accurate interpretation of interview transcripts were
summarized succinctly by Buckley cind Chiang:
Semantic problems include ambiguity, abuse of words
and amphibology, which refers to a statement which
is ambiguous because of its grammatical construction.
A classic example of the latter is...
'The ship was christened by Mrs. Coolidge. The lines
of her bottom were admired by an enthusiastic crowd.
'
Other forms of semantic distortion include:
(1) antiphrasis, the use of a word to convey an
opposite meaning, e.g., 'but Brutus is an honorable
man'; (2) apophasis, making a claim while pretending
to deny it, e.g., 'without seeking to disparage anyone.
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I must confess that I have doubts about Bill's
appointment to the steering committee'; (3)
aposiopesis, an incomplete statement which gives
the reader the option of providing his own con-
clusion, e.g., 'if Amco raises its selling price by
5%, you know darn well what is likely to happen';
(4) catachresis, applying adjectives which are
either too strong or too weak in the circumstances;
e.g., with respect to the 5% increase in Amco '
s
prices, 'Amco announced a fantastic increase in
its prices' (too strong) or 'there v/as a very
insignificant increase in prices' (too weak);
(5) hyperbole, exaggeration: e.g., 'Amco is the
best run company in the history of U.S. business
enterprise'; (6) litotes, or the use of double
or multiple negatives: e.g., I am not sure whether
Amco does not face a problem in deciding whether
or not to increase its prices if the economic pic-
ture gets better or worse'; (7) hypallage, or
inverted relationship among words: e.g., the
information system's management' instead of
'management's information system'; (8) prolepsis,
making an event happen before it could have done
so: e.g., 'Amco's failure in 1969 was attributa-
ble to the recession of 1974'—where, of course, the
dates are usually omitted; (9) metonymy or using
a surrogate term for the real object: e.g., 'The
National Association of Accountants announced a
professional designation to be known as the
"Certificate in Management Accounting"'; (10) false
suggestion, a statement which is true but encourages
a false inference: e.g., 'Amco could be a poorly-
managed company'; and many others.
(Buckley and Chiang, 1976, p. 43)
In summary, the case study approach offers an
appropriate fit between the subject of this inquiry and the
method of research. However, it presents methodological
difficulties in defining the problem and in interpreting the
data. It also raises questions regarding its external
validity and generalizability.
B. LMET CONFERENCE
The second LMET research prcject which comprised the
methodology of this study took place 29 September through 5
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October 19 82. The participants were individuals who were
very knowledgeable of the Navy's Leadership and Management
Education and Training program. Most of the conference
members were involved with the improvement of the current
LMET program in their daily jobs. Participants included
representatives from McBer and Company, Navy Military Per-
sonnel Command (NMPC-62) , Chief of Naval Education and Train-
ing (CNET) , LMET School Coronado, and Naval Postgraduate
School. The conference was hosted by CAPT E.V. Haag, Officer
in Charge, Human Resources Management Detachment, Alameda.
Other participants included CDR Farrer, LT Cady, and ACCS
Hasley of HRMD Alameda. The group of participants was unusual
because virtually all members had significant experience both
in LMET instruction or course design and in other Navy Human
Resources Management activities. Their broad experience and
training in organizational development had induced the partici-
pants to consider methods of reinforcing the LMET competencies
addressed in the two week courses.
1. Purpose
The stated purpose of the conference was to ascertain
any changes in demonstrated frequency of competencies among
LMET graduates assigned to operational commands. Coupled
with this objective was the desire to identify distinguishing
characteristics of commands noted for their excellence which
may promote increased competency use. A third central objec-
tive was to identify and outline LMET enhancing activities.
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Several objectives of a more specific nature were also
articulated. Table 15, provided by HRMD, Alameda details
the conference objectives.
2. Conference Design
The methodology of the conference was designed along
the lines of an organizational development problem-solving
and planning intervention. The activities were facilitated
at different times by CAPT Haag, Mr. Bryan of McBer and Com-
pany, ACCS Hasley of HRMD Alameda, and CDR Williams of NMPC-
62. However, the intervention model presupposed a participa-
tive process in problem identification research design, data
collection, analysis, and brainstorming possible means of
reinforcing use of LMET competencies. All conference members
actively contributed to the design and findings of the
conference.
The first day of this intensive activity was dedi-
cated to team building, initial problem identification, goal
setting, and preparation for data collection. CAPT Haag
facilitated the initial phases of the process. Mr. Bryan
then assumed the role of facilitator in order to ensure that
all participants were familiar with McBer and Company's most
recent activities to provide ongoing evaluation of the LMET
program's effectiveness and their efforts toward reinforcing
and refining LMET instruction. He reviewed three recently
developed instruments as examples of the direction of McBer 's







1. Around and about LMET skills
- collect data about command personnel skill integration
and system support
- analyze data to determine key variables and significant
factors
- assist in collecting NCAP data to extent practicable
- take first step in identification of unique character-
istics of high performing commands
- complete preliminary concept design for LMET enhancing
activities
WHAT ARE WE AFTER
- competency usage—not labels
- don't use competencies in isolation
- can you ask about one competency only
- do certain groups of compentencies hang together—not
necessarily as taught
- implications of which competencies at which levels
- can you attribute anything to the course
- reenforce LMET usage--good learership/management in
command
- sell the concept to the Navy as a whole PAO
- how do we best originate training to sustain
- organization rewards/individual rewards
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"Competency Development Guide," the "Navy Competency Assess-
ment Profile" (NCAP) , and the course outline for the new
Recruit Company Commander LMET course. Mr. Bryan stated that
one use of the NCAP was to evaluate demonstrated changes in
competency use of LMET graduates. He foresaw the employment
of the NCAP and similar instrum.ents to provide pre-test and
post-test data.
The remainder of the day was spent generating the
questions the group wished to answer during the course of
the research project. These questions are illustrated in
Table 16.
3 . Data Collection
The entire research group visited a "high-performing"
Navy command the following day in order to conduct interviews.
The arrangements had been worked ou in advance by HRMD Ala-
meda. HRMD had also prepared the interview format exhibited
in Table 17. This was designed to be a structured interview.
The interview subjects, all LMET graduates, had been selected
and notified in advance. The subjects were a representative
sample of average and superior performers in pay grades E-6
through 0-4.
Although the command was well-prepared to accommodate
the researchers and the interview notably helpful, the inter-
view process did not go as well as anticipated. The research
group found the interview format to be awkward and redundant.
The interviewers as a group were skeptical regarding the quality






1. What competency/skills are required to do your job?
2. Describe a situation where you used leadership comp/
skills that produced a desired effect.
3. That produced an effect not desired .
4. What enhanced use?
5. What blocked use?
6. What has been the most difficult comp/skill for you to
use?
7. What has been the most helpful comp/skill for you?
8. What kind of outcomes have you had?
9. What rewards have you used or experienced by using ccmp/
skills?
10. How can the command support you personally in developing
the competencies ... can support the rest of the command?
11. What was it you learned in LMET that impacted most on
leadership skills demonstrated in this situation?
12. What do you remember about the LMET course?
13. Methods you think the command can use to support what
you learned at LMET. .. (suggestions) —POD/seminars/workshops/
GMT/lectures/PQS/verbal emphasis by command
14. Thinking about the best unit you've been in and the





Listed below are questions about LMET Competency Usage and
actual or potential reinforcement that could be covered
during the individual interviews. The relative emphasis of
each question in specific interviews could vary according to
the role of the interviewee.
1. Have you attended an LMET course?
— Which course?
— When did you attend?
— Where did you attend?
2. Has your immediate supervisor attended LMET?
— Which course?
— When?
3. Have any of your subordinates attended LMET?
— How many?
— When?
4. Have you consciously attempted to apply the LMET compe-
tencies on your job?
— Describe a specific situation in which you applied
them.
— Describe the results you achieved by using the
competencies
.
5. Which five competencies have you been able to use m.ost
often?
-- Describe specific situations in which you applied them.
— Describe the results you achieved by applying them.
6. What factors, both personal and command, have encouraged
you to use the competencies?
— Give specific examples for each factor.
— Describe the results or impact of those factors on




7. Has your immediate supervisor encouraged or helped you
to use the competencies on the job?
— If so, how? (Specific examples)
— What were the results of those examples of
encouragement and help?
8. Which five competencies have you had the most difficulty
using on your job?
9. What factors, both personal and command, have made it
difficult for you to use these competencies on the job?
— Give specific examples for each factor.
— What was the specific impact of each factor?
10. Which five competencies have your subordinates been able
to use most often on the job?
11. What factors, both personal and command, have encouraged
your subordinates to use these competencies?
12. Which five competencies have your subordinates had the
most difficulty using on the job?
13. What factors, both personal and command, have made it
difficult for your subordinates to use these competencies
on the job?
14. Where has LMET had the greatest positive impact on
individual or unit performance within the command?
-- How have you measured the performance impact
(objective and/or subjective measures)
.
15. Have you undertaken any formal or informal efforts to
reinforce the use of the LMET competencies among your
subordinates?
— If so, please describe those efforts as specifically
as possible.




16. Are you aware of any formal or informal efforts within
the command to reinforce people's use of the LMET compe-
tencies?
— If yes, please describe those efforts as specifically
as possible.
— What specific results have been achieved?
17. What specific things could be done within -our command
that would help you use the competencies more often or
more effectively on the job?
18. Who do you see as the key people within the command who
could most effectively reinforce effective use of the
competencies on the job?
~ Why?
19. What objective performance measures within your command
would be most useful for measuring the impact of LMET
on individual, work unit, or command performance?
20. Looking back on the LMET course you attended, what do you
remember that was particularly effective or helpful?
— What, if anything, would you change in the course to
make it more effective?
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The ensuing day was spent in re-design of the inter-
view format that would be inore likely to elicit the data the
group sought. Some initial interpretations were offered as
"strawman" hypotheses for the group to discuss. The day's
activities tended to clarify to the research group some of
the salient issues regarding the effect of command climate
on LMET competency use. Two new interview forms were corpor-
ately designed for use in interviews at the second command.
These are exhibited in Tables 18 and 19 . They were termed
"leading BEI's" by Mr. Bryan of McBer and Company. Ironically,
the data gathered from the re-designed instruments proved to
be no more or less useful thatn the information collected
from interviews at the first command. The interviewers had
done a better job than their initial impressions had led them
to believe.
4 . Coding and Brainstorming
The final day of the conference was devoted to classi-
fication and interpretation of the interview data gathered
from the two commands. A total of 56 individual and group
.
in-erviews had been conducted. Use of unobtrusive measures
in observation provided further information regarding command
factors. Additionally, one of the activities had just com-
pleted an HRM survey. This information served to confirm
certain interviewers' impressions. After information from
each individual's interviews had been recorded on master




LMET COMPETENCY INTERVIEW FORM
SITUATION DESCRIPTION QUESTIONS
•
• What competency/skills are
required to do your job?
• Describe a situation where you
used leadership comp/skills
that produced a DESIRED effect.
• That produced an effect NOT
DESIRED.
* What type problem???
COMPETENCIES DESCRIBED
•
• What enhanced use?
• What blocked use?
• What has been the most difficult
comp/skill for you to use?
• What has been the most helpful
comp/skill for you?
• What kind of outcomes have
you had?
• What rewards have you used or
experienced by using comp/skills?
• Kow can the comm.and support you
personally in developing the
competencies. . .can support the
rest of the command?
• What was it you learned in LMET
that impacted most on leadership
skills demonstrated in this
situation?
SEPARATE QUESTIONS






Methods you think the command
can use to support what you





Verbal emphasis by comman<^
Thinking about the best unit
you've been in and the worst







LMET GROUP INTERVIEW FORM
How are new people treated?
How are people rewarded: Disciplined?
Why are they motivated?
What do supervisors do that are effective?




reflecting the greatest consensus among the subject's responses
were analyzed.
The conference concluded with a brainstorming session




IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. EXPERIENCE OF RESEARCHERS
One of the interesting findings of the NPS research re-
garding LMET competencies in heterogeneous work groups was
the change that occurred within the research group. During
the six month period when the researchers were heavily
involved in the interviewing and coding process, they became
intimately familiar with McBer ' s LMET competencies and behav-
ioral indicators. Indeed, by the end of the coding phase,
all seven graduate students could quote the competencies and
behavioral indicators verbatim. The interviewing had been
a fascinating experience for the students. Each student had
at least one fortunate experience in which he or she inter-
viewed a superior performer, whose narrative of significant
leadership incidents personally affected the researcher. The
interview transcripts animated the LMET competencies in a way
that an academic discussion could not equal. It is doubtful
that certain interview subjects will ever be forgotten by the
researchers. The heightened awareness of the researchers,
coupled with many vivid personal examples of superior per-
formance, began to change the behavior of the student researchers
themselves. The effect was similar to that of the Hawthorne
studies. The student researchers were aware that che research
experience was reinforcing their own use of the LMET competencies
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Positive changes in demonstration of initiative, goal- setting J .
planning and organization, skillful use of influence, and '"^
team building were evident in the student's interactions. In
fact, these changes became something of a self-conscious joke,
and the students frequently called out the alphanumeric codes
when they observed the behavioral indicators of the LMET
competencies in each other. The changes since the student's
participation in the research project ceased are also inter-
esting. As they resumed their usual student roles and duties,
their use of the LMET competencies also gradually declined.
They were not in supervisory positions, thus the opportunities
to employ som.e of the competencies were limited. Their acute
sensitivity toward competency demonstration in others also
lessened as they became engrossed in individual tasks. This
experience is viewed by the author as a metaphor of the be-
havioral cycles of most LMET graduates.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING LMET COMPETENCY
USE; FINDINGS FROJ^ INTERVIEWS
Neither the statistical analysis completed by the NPS
research group nor the textual analysis conducted by the
author, revealed any behavioral differences between LMET
graduates and the control group. Certain individuals indi- j)
cated behavioral changes which they attributed to their LMET
experience but no significant differences could be discovered
for the LMET graduates as a group. All 9 3 interview trans-
cripts v/ere reviewed by the author to determine environmental
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factors which may affect use of LMET competencies. A quali-
tative analysis revealed that the following factors may
^
—
influence the LMET graduates' use of competencies: time
constraints; manning constraints; leadership example set by
superiors; communication flow; attitude toward inspections;
,
em.phasis on subordinate development; perceived lack of ;
support; and lack of a reward system for competency use.
Relevant examples will be provided for each factor. Again,
those examples are subjective descriptions of specific, criti-
cal incidents narrated by the interview subjects. The purpose j^^
of providing such information is to point to organizational >5q
factors which may warrant further study. No claim is made
regarding the generalizability of these findings.
1. Perceived Lack of Support
The following narrative describes the frustrations
of a superior performer. In his role as Master-At-Arms,
he had apprehended an E-3, with a previous drug offense, for
possession of five ounces of marijuana aboard ship.
Anyway, according to CNO ' s policies, he should have
been booted up. However, his department head, his
leading chief, and his LPO could not say enough good
stuff about him. And it was dismissed with a very
stiff verbal warning from the Commanding Officer.
Ticked me off a little bit. If they're going to
play the game, let's do it: the way it's supposed
to.... It shocked me that his department head and
leading chief and LPO could say so much good stuff
abou-c him. Basically they were lying through their
teeth to keep the morale up--to get mc ^e work out
of him if they could.
The Chief Master-At-Arms aboard the ship— he's the
Chief Gunner's Mate. He cares— it's just that he's had
his toes stepped on so many tim.es that he knew what
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should have happened but— I can't say he's given up
—
he's fed up with the futility of him trying to do
the job the way it should be and being either ignored
or told not to worry about it.
The next narrative also happens to involve drug use on duty.
The narrator, an E-4, describes his disgust that an E-6
allowed the incident to occur and that his superiors, an E-7
and an 0-3, refused to initiate any disciplinary action.
I'd been here for a couple of months, I guess ... .More
or less I was just starting to get my feet on the
ground. . . .We had a plane that went down at [another]
base. They wanted me to go over there and trouble-
shoot it. I was sent with [two E-t's, an E-3] , and
some reservist. So we all get in this car with the
senior E-6 being put in charge of this operation. . .
.
We didn't even get off the base, and this [E-3] pulls
out a bag of dope--starts rolling joints, right? So
here I am— I'm new in the outfit... and I'm going--what
the hell are you doing? We're going up to fix an air-
plane, you know? This senior E-6, he didn't think
nothing of it. . .
.
So the guy actually lit up in the car?
Yeah.
But this E-6 didn't say anything?
No, he didn't say a damn thing. Everything was cool.
What did the [E-3] say?
Hey, we always do this, you know?
So we got back, and I talked to the maintenance officer
and the maintenance chief.
What did he do?
He didn't do anything. Quality assurance, this guy's
a senior E-6. If you're quality assurance, you're not
letting people smoke dope.... I just resigned myself
to—this place is so fucked up that I just couldn't
believe it.
Another illuminating example of lack of support from
seniors is presented in the following example narrated by a
superior-performing ACl . One of his subordinates had disobeyed
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"a direct order and left the control tower while on duty. The
ACl wished to bring the subordinate to Captain's Mast for such
flagrant disobedience but his superior squashed the chit
because he did not want the CO. to find out that he had
allowed a television in the Control Tower.
I wrote her up and they asked me--did I want to push
the chit? I said yes. Hell yes. How's it going to
look. Anyways / so we wrote her up, and went down to
the division officer and he decided--how's it going
to look--he says
—
going to Bldg. X—which is where the
highups are—the captain and the XO.
As from a supervisory position— a supervisor's viewpoint
or whatever— I felt that what she did was serious
enough to warrant severe punishment and not just— like
they always, or most of the time do
—
push them all
aside. A chit would go down there—hey we can handle
this—EMI or whatever. I didn't want that. I wanted
here to get something she'd remember—that she would
never do it again.
—what he was worried about was the CO looking at us
—
at our division and what [the Division Officer] was
worried about was how [the CO.] had said before—no
TV in the tower— I guess.
2 . Time/Manning Constraint s
In the following passage, a First Class Petty Officer
expresses his fear regarding safety in a department responsi-
ble for handling nuclear weapons.
Especially more and more the way the job is getting
done because we get more and more work to do with less
and less people. How're we accomplishing this? We're
getting to the point now where we just raid into the
jobs and flail away at them. And get it accomplished.
But my God—at what cost? If we didn't move predominantly
fake ordnance here, we probably would have had an acci-
dent by now. Throw stuff around— leave tools out
—
we'll do the job—take tools out—do the job— leave the
tools. They don't button up after it's over with.
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3. Leadership Example Set by Superiors
In this incident, a recently selected Chief Petty
Officer had been accused of making sexually derogatory com-
ments . The accusation had been made via some anonymous notes
in the department's suggestion box. The soon-to-be chief
was called into the department head's office to discuss these
charges. The interview subject was considered by the author
to be something of a diamond in the rough.
I had just found out that I had been selected for E-7.
And I was called over here, and I had assumed that I
was going to be given the piece of paper
—
you know--
that officially selected me. And also to go through
—
to start the rigamarole that they call the chief's
initiation. .. .And the first thing that comes out is
—
'This isn't what you think it's about.' Then they
told me about the notes: 'Petty Officer X tucks his
shirt in his pants when everyone's around.' 'Petty
Officer X uses crude and vulgar language.' 'Petty
Officer X uses sexual innuendos when speaking.'...
And I—hell, I'd been in the Navy 18 years... and
this is the first time I'd ever heard of anything like
this. And it floored me.... I was feeling I was in the
lion's den. Felt like a Christian in the coliseum....
But then again, here's where the hypocrisy comes in.
During this time I saw the exact same thing goin on
with the people above me. They were doing the exact
same thing—saying the same damn things
—
yet I was
the one getting nailed for it. And it just didn't
set right.
In the following passage, a superior performing E-8 expresses
his reservations regarding the impression Navy recruiters
make on minority groups regarding racial fragmentation in
the Navy.
The Filipino recruited in the Filipino community. The
Hispanic recruited in the Hispanic community. He was
tagged as the individual to go head up a low-rider
conference in [a large city] . And a black was tasked
to go out and get into the black community. And of
course myself was tasked with doing all the middle to
upper income . . . areas ....
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I think if you go down and you send somebody like
myself down there—who took the time— say in the
hispanic community—to learn to' speak the language
or to understand what their culture's like—would
show that the Navy showed its interest across the
board from all different races— for myself to go
out and recruit in that area.
If you send som.ebody out of a like race— I think
the message that they're going to be getting is
going to be—hey look—likes are going to recruit
likes and that's the way it is in the Navy... we
have a separate black group over here ... then we're
going to have a separate Filipino group. That's
my own personal feelings.
In the following example, an E-7 superior performer
describes his command's inconsistent treatment of individuals
exhibiting possible drug or alcohol problems. He points out
the danger to morale and safety of such inconsistent leadership,
What I found was an inconsistency there where there's
one person that was—came to work incapacitated--
well they sent him directly to sick bay which was an
approved thing by the Navy standards ... .However , there's
certain cases where people who have a lot of blud
chips built up let's say, and we have a tendency to
kind of bend the rules a little bit.... One person got a
blood test—they had blood out of his arm--which
happened before he even got out of the truck or some-
thing. And the next person--well they just sent him
home and sleep it off—and so forth. Then after I got
into the situation real deeply and pinned management
down—well they tell me it's too late now. And these
things—they irk me quite a bit and I think a lot of
the people in the Navy and also the airplanes that
they work on—cause if there's any mishap that goes
down
—
you're talking about 2 3 people which is probably
going to go down. So these are some things that I
really pay attention to--now we still don't have a
solid program wirhin this command--like I say--I 'm
not trying to put the Command on report or anything
like that—but it's what I'm trying to do to help the
situation. Lay a level of consistency there of how





A short-sighted attitude toward inspections was
brought out in some interviews. In the following example,
a Lieutenant was informed by his First Class Petty Officer
while they were supervising loading of weapons.
We got big problems, you know. Some guys are
getting stoned at work.
[I] talked to the division officer and the. . .mainte-
nance officer and they just kind of didn't want to
make an issue out of it... deal with the problem. But
we had an NTPI coming up—Nuclear Technical Proficiency
Inspection. Now if you go and get all these guys
busted for drugs--they ' re on the drug program—they
can't be loading special weapons—nuclear weapons
in the PRP
—
personnel got's to do it.
5
.
Training and Subordinate Development
This area appears to be one of the differentiating
factors between high performing commands and others. Several
examples are presented to exhibit the wide range of approaches
successfully utilized.
The following example comes from a command which
placed great importance on training. In this case the CPO
felt that the petty officer trainer was hindering the progress
of her subordinate.
Well at the time, they were training in radar—and
she just it didn't matter what the trainee did, she
picked everything apart--whether it was right or
wrong. And again, I don't— I wasn't there, I didn't
see the actual discrepancy or whatever as it
happened. But she was constantly picking at every-
thing that the trainee did. If it was a good ap-
proach as far as a good radar approach, she might
rate it as fair. If it was a fair approach, she'd
just tell her how lousy it was. And just downgrade
everything that she did. V7e had to separate them
—
getting back to the trainee, she thought she was
doing a good job. The supervisor, after monitoring
142

her, thought she was doing a good job. And that there
was no reason for the third female who was doing the
training to continually be ' downgrading what was being
done. And it was hampering the trainee's progression
toward qualification. We separated them— I took the
one that was trainer
—
put her in another section. Ex-
plained to the new section leader what had been taking
place. Explained to the female that type of behavior
was not acceptable and the female that was training
—
within a very short period after that—was qualified.
Having someone else train her.
And I explained to [the trainer] that when you're train-
ing somebody on a particular position or in any situa-
tion, that if they're doing a poor job--you explain to
them what's being done wrong—explain to them how they
can better do the job and that downgrading them isn't
helping anybody to progress. And that it would be to
her advantage to help people. Again explaining what's
wrong with their technique or their control, and how
they can improve it. It's that simple. Instead, again,
of saying—that's a lousy approach. Tell them what was
wrong with it and tell them or show them how they can
improve it.
A different approach to subordinate development is presented
below. It was equally effective.
6 petty officers—E-5's and E-6's who were at the club
for lunch
—
getting blitzed—drunk. Come back and
couldn't perform their duties. Mainly if they was
supposed to be working high up aloft—on the king
boatswain—harnesses. And he's up there bobbing and
weaving around--so drunk he couldn't even work. So
the next day I pulled them all in--knocked them off first
—told them to go down and hit the rack or hit your
liberty or whatever. Next day pulled them in and
restricted them. TOld them they couldn't leave the
ship the rest of the weekend. They couldn't under-
stand why. I told them—the Navy don ' r. like you
going over and getting drunk—drinking at noon hour
and coming back and trying to perform you duties.
Cause the non-rates see it and then the non-rates go
over drinking. Pretty soon there ain't nobody getting
the work done. At the time we had a hell of a lot of
work to do--in preparation for refresher training.
—they wanted to know why they were restricted? This
is right after I came aboard— I'd been aboard about
three months. Couldn't understand why I restricted
them. So I told them why I restricted them. Fucking
went over and got drunk and didn't come back to work
when they was scneduled to. That's that.
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So what did they do?
They stayed aboard all weekend and got the work done.
Bitched and moaned and cried a lot.
Was. anybody supervising them while they were onboard
that weekend?
Yes sir. The chief boatswain's mate. He made sure
they did what I told them they was to do.
What rank would he be then?
E-6 and E-7.
Senior to them?
No. One of them was. The other one was junior to
them, matter of fact. That degraded them even more.
Fuck 'em—they'd already screwed up. That's their
fault.
This particular Chief Petty Officer summarized his
philosophy toward subordinate development as follows:
—you don't want to do it to a new kid in the Navy--
he don't know what the hell is going on
—
you give
him a fair breathing time to get squared away—then
you start screaming at him.
Another Chief related the following story as an
example of subordinate development:
This young lad that worked for me— I was leading chief
of the weapons department at that time
—
got caught
coming across the brew with booze.
Well, he got— the Master at Arms put him on report
and he went up to Captain's Mast— and he got 15 days
restriction and a fine. Ke did this restriction—didn't
miss a muster
—
paid his fine and was alright for about
30 days. Got caught again. But this time he thought
he was going to gat away with it. Threw it over the
side.
I give him some EMI. I thought I had his attention
and I sat him down and I counseled him and told him
not to do that shit no more. Booze is not allowed aboard
ship. I would venture to say it was two weeks tc the
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day he got caught coming aboard the brow with a
half pint of Suntory strapped to his leg. Well we
put him on report and brought him up to the office.
I'll bet there was probably 15 officers in there.
[I thought] Aw—what the fuck. He's standing there
in front of my desk—take your hat off. So he took
his hat off. I stepped around my desk and I open
handed him—right along the head. Now put your
fucking hat on--get back to work. Well he did 6
days restriction and a bust. And right now today
he's a chief.
On board?
No—he's not on board. In a squadron on the East
Coast.
But this guy writes me letters every now and then.
And he keeps bringing that back up— that's why I
was giggling—thought it was funnier than hell.
Keeps telling m.e— the only thing that ever stuck in
his mind—he's a poor little rich boy—never held
accountable to anything. Could give a shit less
about the money—could give a shit less about the
restriction— so he had to stay aboard— so what?
Well when I made him take his hat off--and that
slap up alongside the head--that rang his chimes
a little bit and then made him put his hat on
—
and go to work—that stuck in his gourd.
The following E-8 related an example of subordinate
development that was so successful that it reinforced the
senior chief's utilization of these competencies.
We were talking one day and she felt she'd been getting
a bad shake in the military. Being a female, you
know. And she had never really been given a chance
to be a controller. I was the tower manager at the time.
I told her— if this is what you really want, I'll help
you do it. I'll make you a good controller— in fact, I'll
make you the best controller. And I'll give you every
chance you need. But I'll tell you it's going to be
hard because I'll expect more from you because I have
given you my time. She said fine. So we went about
her training. At times I was pretty hard on her, you
know. But she took it all in stride. And she did— she
is qualified. She is m.y best controller. And this--it
makes me feel real good— somebody that never had a
chance—her whole outlook on the Navy and males in the
Navy is different. I think I had a lot to do with
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changing it because I give her this chance. I'm not the
person that believes just because she's a female that
she can't do anything. I believe everybody can do any-
thing. Because, to me, I can't is not in my
vocabulary.
And I'd do things and she'd ask me—why did I do it that
way and I'd tell her. And I'd show her different ways
to do things—easier. I just told her
—
you want to be
this good, I'll make you this good.
Do you remember her specific reaction at that point?
She just looked at me. She didn't say anything. She
just smiled. I think it kind of shocked her. No one
had ever made this offer to her.
And I started putting her on straight days so she would
be exposed to a lot more air traffic than she would be
at nights. So I was there everytime she was working
—
I was plugged in with her. . Tell her what to do. Even
after she'd do something—I'd let her do it—then I'd
tell her an easier way to do it and tell her what she could
have done to make it easier for her. And make it a
little more expeditious. Just small things. Same thing
you do with any controller. I used to nitpick her a lot
more than I used to do other people.
One day we was just sitting, and talking. She said—thank




just that with her I saw that I did it with one
person. Well, I said, if I can do it with one person, I
can do it with someone else. Then I just started pushing
a lot of people that I saw had the potential and weren't
using it. Got all the potential--brought it out. Let
them know they did have it. And make them use it. Got
a pretty good qualification rate here in the five years
I've been here.
Another supervisor used an overtly maternal approach to sub-
ordinate developm.ent with great success.
Oh, I'm so proud. My buttons pop off. I just—we have
jne girl out there--her main mission in life was to get
out of the Navy or be a. . .corpsman. She said—oh, I
can't do this. Or, I don't like this job, it's greasey
or blah, blah, blah. Or whatever. She's been working
with me now about a year and her whole attitude--she 'd
done 18 0. She's become an effective leader and she is
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just barely a 3rd Class. She just sewed it on. She is
so motivated—I'm so proud of her. I feel like she's one
of my own children. She's about the same age as my own
kids anyway— so I really feel proud of her. For the
change she personally has made. And she attitude-wise,
she's accepted her rating now. She likes her job--not
as well as other people like their jobs—but she doesn't
talk about wanting to be a corpsman every other sentence.
She's happy, she's adjusted and I'm real proud of her.
I'm extremely proud of my crew and I think they know it.
I think that's part of it too. I more or less kept on
her—when she did a good job. She would say--I can't do
this, I don't do this very good. And I gave her a little
nickname. Gerdy, I'd say, you're great. You know, and
so I say—Gerdy, you're great. You're doing good. Gerdy,
that's good. Made all the g's. When she signs cards for
everybody now, she puts Gerdy. I just tell her she's doing
a good job. And she could do it. And I tell—that's
why you're making the big bucks
—
you'll make 3rd Class
at this rate. You'd be a bed pan emptier the rest of your
life, you'd be an E-3, you know if you went as a corpsman.
And I kept telling her, you know, all the advantages
—
not pushing at her, but just in a way where she knew I
was concerned about her--wanted her to be happy. But, you
know, she opened her own eyes. Let her do it herself. I
don't want her to think I was pushing torpedo mince m.eat
down her throat. But I just told her
—
you done good. Look
at that. The last time you fixed that pad, the weapon ran
great. You know, let her know that she is an effective
torpedoman. She's not a—now she know it. I tell her
—
you're great and look at that and this did good. And now
she knows it. And she's come so far and she's grown up
a lot too. I let her have responsibility. She's a good
worker. I told her she's one of my best. I tell them
all that. And they are.
How did she respond to the additional responsibility?
Superbly.
Initially?
Shocked. Let me do this? Why is she having me be in
charge? Cause you're good at it. That's good. Now,
she ready— she could be in charge today out there.
She could take over my job today. She could do it.
She could step right into it. That 3 saying a lot for
a kid that didn't want to be one to oegin with.
6 . Communication
Barriers to communication were cited repeatedly as
major factors in de-motivation, inefficiency, and interpersonal
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friction. This area appears to be a key roadblock to utili-
zation of LMET competencies. The nature and degree of com-
munications problems vary, but one barrier is attitude. As
one chief so aptly stated;
Hell, no, I don't ask their opinion. Opinions are
like assholes—everyone's got one.
In the following passage, a Second Class Petty
Officer described some communication difficulties that he
perceived in the manner in which officers spoke to enlisted
personnel. He found officers to be, in general, patronizing
and intimidating. This description was prompted by his rela-
tion of an incident in which a pilot had bullied them into
allowing him to fly a plane off an aircraft carrier despite
the mechanics' statement that the plane was "down." The
aircraft had a massive hydraulic failure in flight. They
were all lucky that the plane did not crash.
Ok. Officers—to enlisted guys—officers are kind of
intimidating. It's not like a chief—a chief is almost
human. An E-7, they're pretty human. But as far as
officers go, they're college-educated. They know this
and they know that. They're the guys that when the word
comes down—they're usually the ones who 're enforcing it.
They have direct supervision over us. So we know that
they're always there—riding us. Our effort is to please
them as much as possible. To keep them from having a
confrontation with an officer. Because when he talks
to you, he sort of talks down to you. He's not going to
talk on the same level. It's not like talking to a chief
or 1st Class or one of your peers.
In the next incident, another Second Class Petty
Officer praised his division officer for opening up freer
lines of communication in the division. He felt that this
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served to encourage cohesiveness and productivity in his
Personnel Office.
Oh yeah. We used to have bitch sessions in there
—
we'd sit down face to face and spit it out—exactly
what was on our minds.
Who participated in the bitch sessions? You and who
else?
We did it mainly with Lcdr X—when he was a Lt—was
the personnel officer—the guy was great—the guy's
fucking great. He would situ us down once a week
Friday afternoon and we would have our bitch sessions
—
find out what exactly— sometimes there wasn't even
anything going on—there were a couple of major
incidents
—
Communication is mentioned only in passing by a Senior
Chief Petty Officer who had described the difficulties that
his Branch Officer, an Ensign, had encountered in establishing
authority and gaining recognition for a major project well
done.
I could not tell you— I could not tell you. Everybody
looks down on Ensigns. We got officers who won't even
talk to Ensigns.
In the next incident, a division officer related some of
the consequences of a situation in which his department head
relied on the information of an E-5 and chronically by-passed
the chain of command.
But once I got there, I told the— first I told the EMl
to tell the EM2 to stay out of the chief engineer's
stateroom. I didn't ever want to see him up there.
That didn't work. Because whenever the EM2 did something
wrong and myself or the EMI assigned him extra duty
—
put on report or whatever, things just mysteriously never
happened—once it went past my level. The chief en-
gineer is protecting him--he had two or three of his
boys m.ore or less picked out, within the department--
who could do no wrong—and that was the situation.
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In the following narrative, a department head des-
cribed how he overcame years of "bad blood" between his
department and the Civilian Personnel office on base through
a series of face-to-face discussions. By establishing effec-
tive communication with this office, he was able to receive
three permanent ceiling points and hire civilian personnel.
His department had gotten by with one temporary for years
prior to that, causing tremendous backlogs in production.
So the asst. division officer said—hey, go over to
personnel and find out what's going on—meeting people
first-hand. And see what we can do about it. And he
went over there and had a very negative experience—he
was like everybody else. A lot of bad blood apparently
between Civilian personnel?
Personnel which was NAS . And didn't really get much
resolved—Pandora's Box— I guess. And it ended up with
that individual and myself going over there and talking
with them. And we got an awful lot resolved and within
a month—we had the paperwork set up where we were going
to hire this individual permanently and then boost her up
to a 7 . And that looked great but that didn't solve our
problem. Some more liaison with [our ISIC] --starting
looking around saying— hey, look we're falling on our
swords here—we need to get some help—how do we go about
it? Noboday knew how to find ceiling points or anything
else—eventually what we did was reinvent the wheel— it
must have existed at some time or other—but certainly
never existed here—and within three months we had three
editor-writers on line— tripled our resources in that
area. Hired two additional civilians--never could have
been done before and got it done. So once again we had
a very positive incident—the things that maybe you're
interested in there—the interaction with NAS personnel
and the fact that what was really necessary--was to go
over and meet the people myself--the syllabus director and
the asst. division officer—and get to know the people a
little bit. It seemed like a lot of the bad blood kind
of died—nobody really knew where it came from. Things
weren't really important anymore--all the problems
that had made it impossible before—and it was incredible
what was accomplished in such a short period of time.
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7. Incongruent Reward System
Another recurring theme in the interviews was that
individuals worked toward what was rewarded. However, the
reward systems in organizations often inadvertently promoted
dysfunctional behavior.
A very highly regarded Senior Chief Petty Officer
expressed his views regarding his superiors ' motivation and
its effect on their decision-making. His views reflected
experience at many commands
.
The department heads—Lcdr—more senior and they're very
reluctant to rock the boat. What I mean by that is
—
you may have all your ducks in a row and everything may
be legal—however, they want to look at all the facets
of how it's going to affect their career and how it's
going to affect the CO ' s career and how it's going to
affect the XO ' s career. And their criteria or whether or
not to pass this thing on up the chain of command is that
criteria. It's not the criteria of --is it legal and is
it right—how's it going to affect them in the future.
The following passage illustrates an interesting
twist on the management reward system. The narrator, a Chief
Petty Officer, had ordered three black airmen to perform a
particular task along with 13 white personnel in the division.
When accused of discriminatory practices, the narrator
fully expected to be supported, not on the basis of the facts,
but due to his perception of the views of his superiors. In
this example, he was confronted by civilian investigators
from the NAACP.
They said—we have a complaint filed against you with
the National Chapter of the NAACP. I says—whoa—back
on down. I said— the first thing that you do--you go
see the squadron duty officer and the executive officer
and you check with the commanding officer. If the
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commanding officer says you can talk with me
—
you talk
to me—but until then you don't come into my shop.
Now would you kindly leave? Well, my CO comes from
Meridian Mississippi. The XO comes from Mobile,
Alabama,
A division officer described her frustration with
the difficulties of admonishing and attempting to fire a
civil service individual who exhibited bizarre behavior.
She was shocked to find that she could not require him to
have a medical evaluation.
[he would] just totally lose his train of thought—and
stop— slurrish—sluggish—if it had been a military
individual, he immediately would have had a competency
review exam run to find out if this individual was on
drugs—had an alcohol problem—but with—we really can't
do that—not a union but something like a union.
She never succeeded in firing the individual, but
after documenting his behavior for a year, she managed to
have him transferred to a position where "he wasn't as
dangerous .
"
A Chief Petty Officer related some of the consequences
of the position description system influencing the behavior
of another civil service employee.
So I asked him—well on this piece of gear will you
give a lecture. And he said—no sir. And I thought
he was just joking. So I'm still... on it. Aw come on,
give a lecture. I thought he was going to finally say
yes. He said no. He said— I do not get paid to give
lectures. That was the end of that. So I just kind
of backed down.
So that was the end of it?
Yeah. I tried to come back later and ask him—well how
come you're not willing to give lectures? Well, the
simple fact is we're not getting paid ofr it. According
to my contract, I don't have to do anything that I'm
not supposed to do. This is all a part of me. And it
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really struck me as kind of strange too, you know.
We're pretty friendly in this shop. Everybody is on,
like I said, a first name basis. And it's more or less
like a request to help us out. Like a plea to help
us out. They just turned their backs.
The following incident, described by a First Class
Petty Officer, illustrates what happened to a civilian tech-
nician in his department when quantity of repair work was
stressed as the primary criterion of productivity.
He was the best TACAN technician that this hangar ever
had. One of the things he would do would be to start
from the first page of the book and go step-by-step
through a TACAN and when he was done with the book—the
TACAN was done—and it would stay out for 100 hours
or more, which is fabulous running time for an old TACAN.
He was a fantastic technician. And he was a good
natured guy and he just got fed up with the program.
You mentioned that the division officers— some of them
—
were concerned about his output. What was his output
compared to the average?
Compared to the average—maybe two, three or four units
a week depending on the problems they had. But you
could always guarantee a good TACAN out of him.
Did you feel that he was one of the people who wasted
time?
No, definitely not. He never wasted any time as far as
I can remember. He was alv/ays working.
Very meticulous?
Yes. He was really good.
Finally, another First Class Petty Officer described
an experience in which the civilian contractor pay and per
diem system served as incentive to retard productivity.
I don't know how to explain it but I kind of expect
this out of Civil Service? Ok? It's not that I have--
over the years I've seen them work. They'll take the
job and they'll instead of wanting to get it done, ok,
they're getting paid probably by the hour, or overtime,
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or something like that. The longer they can take the
job, especially when they're not—they came from the
East Coast—fly out here. Especially drawing per diem.
The longer they can take on the job, the more money
they're going to make. You can't argue with them there.
There really isn't anything that a dumb white hat like
I am that can do to civilians.
C. LMET CONFERENCE FINDINGS
Individual findings of the conference members were col-
lated and a frequency analysis performed. The central re-
search questions and the most representative findings are
presented in the following tables excerpted from the confer-
ence report produced by HRMD Alameda. These findings tended
to agree with the author's findings from the interview analy-
sis that command climate influenced the individual's use of
LMET competencies. This report also confirmed that emphasis
on training, communications, and a congruent reward system
were perceived to be crucial factors in either inhibiting or
retarding LMET competency use. Both commands visited for
research purposes were considered to be high performing com-
mands. An interesting by-product of this research was the
finding that the BEI technique provided a useful method to
flesh out and provide more in depth research indicated by
the KRM survey results. Used together, the two methods of
inquiry seemed to provide a clearer understanding of some
of the causative factors in attitudes of command personnel,




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of both projects indicated a very favorable
reaction to the Navy LMET program. People like the courses
and feel that they meet a need for training in these areas.
However, there is no hard or soft evidence to indicate that
LMET, at this point in its implementation, has brought about
any behavioral changes in the graduates as a group. Indi-
viduals who have demonstrated behavioral changes which they
attribute to LMET exhibit the following characteristics.
They had a strong desire to change and indicated that they
felt they had room for improvement in leadership and manage-
ment skills. They had some experience in supervisory posi-
tions in th^ Navy, but they tended to be relatively junior.
That is, they did not have decades of experience in the Navy
to formulate and rigidify their values and rationale for
management practices. They returned directly to a management
position after graduating from LMET. They had some initial
successes in putting into practice some of the LMET compe-
tencies. They mentioned the example or guidance of an
iiTimediata superior or peer role model. Finally, they tended
to be assigned to Navy commands noted for their organizational
effectiveness and stress on subordinate deyelopmejit
.
The provisions of the LMET program for self-evaluation
and competency reinforcem.ent through use of the student
journals is largely ineffective except in cases where the
155

individual is unusually motivated. The organization and
the LMET graduate's immediate superior appear to play
crucial roles in influencing the individual's use of LMET
competencies
.
The following recommendations have been inferred from
this study. Efforts should continue to send Navy personnel
to LMET courses immediately prior to reporting to their next
duty assignments. Efforts to market LMET to Navy personnel
would foster continued interest and support of the LMET pro-
gram. Efforts to reinforce LMET competency awareness and
utilization at the unit level may encourage actual behavioral
changes in LMET graduates. A program to promote increased
organizational emphasis on effective communications, s^ibor-
dinate development, and problem solving techniques would
increase the probability of providing a command atmosphere
receptive to the individual's attempts to change his behavior.
In the author's opinion, a well-designed program would serve
to increase the effectiveness of the current level of
training.
The author also noted that, with certain exceptions,
little interest, knowledge, cooperation or support was evi-
dent in LMET and HRM organizations below the staff level
.
Occasionally, outright antagonism and rivalry were noted
betv/een some HRM and L.MET personnel. It could be surmised
that this attitude is an unfortunate and unintended conseouence
156

of the initial decision to establish independent activities
tasked to provide LMET instruction. The author believes
that Human Resources Management activities have the potential
to implement the recommended reinforcement activities for
LMET competency use at the operating unit level. It is
recommended that an ongoing pilot project tasking co-located
LMET and HRM units to engage in cross-training facilitators,
develop prototype workshops, and implement a concerri'ted LMET
reinforcement plan of action in consonance with local operating
units, in order to determine the feasibility and effective-
ness of sucH a program. It is believed that a joint program
to reinforce LMET competency use would strengthen the credi-
bility of the LMET program, provide greater coherence to
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